Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Dissertations
8-22-2008

Three Essays in Public Finance
Shiyuan Chen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Chen, Shiyuan, "Three Essays in Public Finance." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2008.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1061485

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Economics Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia
State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

PERMISSION TO BORROW
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree
from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available
for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type.
I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from or to publish this dissertation may be granted
by the author or, in his or her absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in
his absence, by the Dean of the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Such quoting, copying,
or publishing must be solely for scholarly purposes and must not involve potential financial gain.
It is understood that any copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential
gain will not be allowed without written permission of the author.

____________________
Signature of the Author

NOTICE TO BORROWS
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement.
The author of this dissertation is:
Shiyuan Chen
1322 Briarwood Road NE, APT I-12
Atlanta, GA, 30319
The director of this dissertation is:
Dr. Sally Wallace
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
P.O.Box 3992
Atlanta, GA, 30302-3992
Users of this dissertation not regularly enrolled as students at Georgia State University are
required to attest acceptance of the preceding stipulations by signing below. Libraries borrowing
this dissertation for the use of their patrons are required to see that each user records here the
information requested.
Name of User

Address

Date

Type of use (Examination only or copying)

THREE ESSAYS IN PUBLIC FINANCE
BY
SHIYUAN CHEN

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
of
Georgia State University

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
2008

Copyright by
Shiyuan Chen
2008

ACCEPTANCE
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate’s Dissertation Committee. It
has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics in
the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies of Georgia State University.

Dissertation Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace
Committee:
Dr. Yongsheng Xu
Dr. David Sjoquist
Dr. Dillon Alleyne

Electronic Version Approved:
James R. Alm, Dean
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
August 2008

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation is one of the most important achievements in my life so far. While I feel
a little relaxed now and try to recall the past, what I most want to say is: it is never easy. To
survive the doctorate program, complete a dissertation and in the end earn a Doctor of
Philosophy in Economics is not something that I could do it by myself alone. I thank all of
you who have supported me in financing, study, personal life, and many other places over
these years. All of these make things possible for me, and thank you! Due to limited space, I
am only allowed to give my special thanks to a selected group of people who have been
involved closely with me in the dissertation writing process.
First I would like to gratefully and sincerely thank the chair of my committee, Dr. Sally
Wallace, for your guidance and supports in numerous ways. As a graduate research assistant,
I have worked with you for a couple of years. During these years I have the chance to access
various research projects and accumulate academic research experience. As my dissertation
committee chair, you are always very supportive in helping me to form the ideas, structure
my work, write the essays, and finalize the dissertation. For everything you have done for me,
Dr. Wallace, thank you! I have learned so much from you and I will work hard to grow
myself as an economics like you!
I am also indebted to my committee members, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. David Sjoquist,
and Dr. Dillon Alleyne. Dr. Xu has provided me enormous helps from the very beginning of
the first essay. I really appreciate your help and advice both in academic research and my
career development. You are always there when I need helps. Without the helps from you, the
models in this dissertation would take much more time from me. You are a great teacher as
well as a great friend! To Dr. Sjoquist, your extensive knowledge and wisdom have helped
hugely. You have given me so many useful comments and suggestions for all three essays.
The essays have avoided many weakness and mistakes with your help. To Dr. Dillon Alleyne,
although you are far away in Jamaica, you are always kindly offering me various helps.
Especially I would like to thank you for offering help in the Jamaica Survey of Living
Conditions data. I believe I have to continue to ask for more helps from you in the future.
I would also like to thank Dr. Mary Beth Walker, Dr. Bruce Seaman, and Dr. Neven T.
Valev. As readers of my dissertation, you have provided helps in econometric techniques,
economic modeling, and research methodology for the proposal of this dissertation. All of
your suggestions and comments are integrated into this dissertation. Thank you!
I would like to thank the Department of Economics at Georgia State University and its
faculty. The doctorate funding makes it financially possible for me to complete the doctorate
program. The classes here have taught me a wide range of economics knowledge and
research methodology. The years at Georgia State University are sure to be most important
time in my life.
I would like to thank Xiamen University and my friends, classmates, and teachers there. I
had a best time there with all of you. Without your help, it’s not possible for me to come to
the United States and pursue a degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics. I miss all of
you so much! We should meet soon. My special thanks will go to Dr. Chongming Qiu, my
vi

advisor in the Master’s program, Dr. Jinzhi Tong, my advisor in the Bachelor’s program, Dr.
Chaoyun Du, Dr. Yinggang Zhou, Dingfeng Ye, Tingting Yan and Dandan Chen. Thank you
all for continuously helping me in these years.
Here I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at Georgia State University. You
have helped me in so many aspects of my study and daily life. Riatu M. Qibthiyyah, you are
my classmate for these years at Georgia State University and we have overcome so many
difficulties together. Thank you! Minghung Yao, Artidiatun D. Adji, Nandya Yuwono, Juan
Sun, Meng Wang, Ki-Whan Choi, and Zhenghua Hu, thank you all for your helps too! To the
best roommates I could ever have, Guangzhi Zheng and Wenyi Wu, you made my life easier
and more interesting in these years, thank you! To Dr. Felix Rioja, Bess Blyler, Wanda
Cooley, Mary Kenyatta, LaTonya Edwards, Christopher Peters, Bo Ko, and Gardner Neely,
thank you for your excellent administration and technical assistance work, and you are also
great friends!
Finally, I would like to thank my families. You support me and encourage me to go
ahead all the time. I know you are always there for me: this dissertation is also yours. To my
father, Yicha Chen, and my mother, Kuang Lin, thank you for always believing in me. I
finally make it! To my brother, Shidian Chen, and my sister, Lian Chen, thank you for always
encouraging me, supporting the family, and being with Mom and Dad in these years. I have
been far away from you for too long time, and I shall be at home very soon.

vii

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................vi
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................x
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................................xii
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................... xiii
Essay 1: A Theory of Trading of Club Goods and Its Application to Jurisdiction Formation ..1
Literature Review and Motivation .........................................................................................1
A Model for Clubs with Trading Club Goods .......................................................................5
The Start Point: A World without Trading of Club Goods................................................7
A Model of Trading Club Goods .....................................................................................12
Conclusions......................................................................................................................33
An Analysis Framework for the Formation of Jurisdictions ...............................................38
A Model for Jurisdiction Formation ................................................................................38
Jurisdiction Formation Process ........................................................................................41
Conclusions......................................................................................................................42
Essay 2: Food Consumption in Jamaica: A Household Behavior as well as a Social Behavior
..................................................................................................................................................44
Literature Review and Motivation .......................................................................................44
Spatial Models and Diagnostics Methods............................................................................46
Spatial Models .................................................................................................................46
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence ................................................................................48
Data: Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions ........................................................................50
Data Introduction and Summary......................................................................................50
Weight Matrix..................................................................................................................54
Model Specification and Estimation....................................................................................56
Model Specification .........................................................................................................56
Diagnostics for Spatial Lag and Spatial Error Dependence.............................................57
Model Estimation.............................................................................................................59
Discussion and Summary.....................................................................................................63
Effect of Income ..............................................................................................................63
Effect of Household Structure .........................................................................................63
Effect of Social factors: Income Level in the Society and Neighborhood ......................64
Summary ..........................................................................................................................66
Application to Poverty Problem...........................................................................................67
Essay 3: A Survival Analysis of Education Duration in Jamaica............................................70
viii

Literature Review.................................................................................................................72
Education Literature.........................................................................................................72
Survival Analysis .............................................................................................................75
Data and Empirical Methods ...............................................................................................77
Data: Introduction and Summary.....................................................................................77
Empirical Methods: Introduction to Survival Analysis ...................................................87
Empirical Analyses ..............................................................................................................90
Semi-parametric Survival Analysis: Cox Regression......................................................91
Parametric Survival Analysis: Logit Model ....................................................................94
Policy Implications ............................................................................................................103
Where Is the Problem?...................................................................................................103
What Factors Matter?.....................................................................................................105
How: Some Policy Suggestions .....................................................................................105
Conclusions........................................................................................................................108
APPENDIX............................................................................................................................110
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................111
VITA ......................................................................................................................................128

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 1 THE POSSIBILITY OF TRADING CLUB GOODS: INCREASING MC CASE ...10
2 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 2 THE POSSIBILITY OF TRADING CLUB GOODS: DECREASING MC CASE ..11
3 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 3 THE POSSIBILITY OF TRADING CLUB GOODS: CONSTANT MC CASE ....12
4 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 4 A MARKET FOR CLUB GOODS................................................................17
5 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 5 FORMATION OF THE MARKET FOR CLUB GOODS ...................................19
6 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 6-1 NO ADJUSTING WHEN P>MIN(ATC) -POOR CLUBS/SELLERS .............25
7 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 6-2 ADJUSTING PROCESS WHEN P<MIN(ATC) -RICH CLUBS ....................25
8 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 7 ACTUAL COST VS SHADOW COST (I: ACTUAL; II: SHADOW) ..................29
9 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 8 CLUB FORMATION- DECREASING MC....................................................32
10 (ESSAY 1) FIGURE 9 CLUB FORMATION- CONSTANT MC.....................................................33
11 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 1 HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE IN JAMAICA, 2001.................52
12 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 2-1 PLOTS FOR TOTEXP, TOTFOOD, AND ENGEL'S COEFFICIENT .............53
13 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 2-2 A PLOT FOR TOTEXP, TOTFOOD, AND ENGEL’S COEFFICIENT BY
POPDEC .............................................................................................................................53
14 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 3 JURISDICTION STRUCTURE & WEIGHT MATRIX ...................................55
15 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 4-1 PLOTS OF SAC ESTIMATION-1..........................................................61
16 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 4-2 PLOTS OF SAC ESTIMATION-2..........................................................62
17 (ESSAY 2) FIGURE 5 PLOT FOR MARGINAL INCREASE IN ENGEL’S COEFFICIENT .................64
18 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 1 STUDENT DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA 2002 (GRADE 1-13)...................83
19 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 2 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN JAMAICA 2002 (BY AGE GROUP).........85
20 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 3 NUMBER OF PEOPLE BY MARRIAGE AND AGE .....................................91
x

21 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 4-1 ESTIMATED HAZARD CURVES FOR TYPICAL INDIVIDUALS .............101
22 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 4-2 ESTIMATED SURVIVAL CURVES FOR TYPICAL INDIVIDUALS ..........101
23 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 5-1 LIFE TABLE ANALYSIS-SURVIVAL CURVE, BY AGE GROUP AND
GENDER ...........................................................................................................................102

24 (ESSAY 3) FIGURE 5-2 LIFE TABLE ANALYSIS-DROPOUT HAZARD CURVE, BY AGE GROUP
AND GENDER ...................................................................................................................102

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Page

Table

1 (ESSAY 1) TABLE 1 A SUMMARY OF FORMATION OF CLUBS WITH TRADING .........................34
2 (ESSAY 1) TABLE 2 DEPENDENT AND SINGLE JURISDICTION STRUCTURE ..............................41
3 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 1 A SUMMARY OF DATA (1).......................................................................51
4 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 2 A SUMMARY OF DATA (2).......................................................................51
5 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 3 AN ILLUSTRATION OF WEIGHT MATRIX DEFINED BY EDS .......................56
6 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 4 AN OLS ESTIMATE .................................................................................58
7 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 5 AN OLS ESTIMATE FOR THE REDUCED MODEL ......................................58
8 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 6 DIAGNOSTIC TESTS .................................................................................59
9 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 7 MLE ESTIMATE FOR SAC, SAR, SEM MODELS .....................................60
10 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 8 GMM ESTIMATE FOR SAC, SAR, SEM MODELS ..................................60
11 (ESSAY 2) TABLE 9 CHANGE IN ENGEL’S COEFFICIENT WITH 1% INCREASE IN TOTEXP BY
POPDEC .............................................................................................................................63
12 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 1 ENROLLMENT IN JAMAICA 2002 (BY SCHOOL TYPE)..............................80
13 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 2 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN JAMAICA 2002 (BY SCHOOL TYPE) .....81
14 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 3 HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC CONSTITUENTS IN JAMAICA 2002 ............82
15 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 4 STUDENT DISTRIBUTION IN JAMAICA 2002 (GRADES 1-13) ..................83
16 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 5 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN JAMAICA 2002: GRADE REPORTED (BY
AGE GROUP) ......................................................................................................................85

17 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 6-1 MARITAL STATUS REPORTED (AGE >=15) .........................................86
18 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 6-2 UNION STATUS REPORTED (AGE >=15) .............................................86
19 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 7 ESTIMATION OF DISCRETE TIME COX MODEL.......................................94
20 (ESSAY 3) TABLE 8 ESTIMATION OF DISCRETE TIME SURVIVAL MODEL-LOGIT MODEL .....99

xii

ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS IN PUBLIC FINANCE
BY SHIYUAN CHEN
August 2008
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation comprises three essays in public finance. The first essay is a research of
a theory of trading of club goods and its application to jurisdiction. The essay establishes a
model of trading of club goods among clubs, and illustrates its effects on the process and
outcome of club formation. Cost function as well as disutility of crowdedness is emphasized
and integrated into the process of club formation, after allowing for exchanging club good
among clubs. In the process, the essay develops a market for club goods. Then the model is
revised and applied to the formation of jurisdictions.
The second essay comes out of an interest regarding household demand, poverty and
public goods in developing countries. The essay explores household food consumption in
Jamaica and estimates the effects of related variables. With Jamaica Survey of Living
Conditions 2001 data, the essay estimates an Engel curve which reflects the relation between
household food consumption and related variables. What’s more, to investigate the possible
neighborhood effect on food consumption, the essay tests and estimates the spatial correlation
among neighborhood food consumption. The estimated results can be applied to poverty
reduction policy.
The third essay extends the theme of poverty, consumption, and government programs by
analyzing one other public program—education. Education is closely linked to poverty
alleviation. Determining the demand for education and the return to education will help
government focus programs aimed at reducing drop-out rates and in the long run, poverty in
xiii

the country. The essay applies discrete time survival analysis techniques to analyze education
duration in Jamaica. Based on Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2002, the essay estimates
the effects of household, individual and other related covariates on dropout risks of students.
The essay compares discrete time Cox model and discrete time Logit model and concludes
that the two estimations are consistent. The estimation results could be used to predict the
effects of changes in the covariates, or be used to predict the dropout risks of particular
students in each grade, both of which could provide useful policy implications to improve
education in Jamaica.

xiv
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Essay 1: A Theory of Trading of Club Goods and Its Application to
Jurisdiction Formation
Club theory originated from Buchanan (1965) and Tiebout (1956). Since then, it has
attracted great interests of economists and been developed and applied to different aspects of
group formation, varying from local groups (e.g., local jurisdictions) to international
organization in terms of size, and also from public groups to private groups in terms of
ownership, etc. In this paper, we mostly focus on the application of club theory to the
formation of local jurisdictions, although the conclusions of our analysis should be able to
apply to any other forms of clubs as long as our basic assumptions hold. We’ll establish a
model of trading of club goods among clubs, and illustrate its effects on the process and
outcome of club formation. The paper has three sections: in Section 1 we will introduce the
motivation and have a brief literature review; in Section 2, we’ll build a model of trading of
club goods among clubs; in Section 3, the model will be applied to analyze the formation of
jurisdictions.

Literature Review and Motivation
Buchanan (1965) defined a club as an impure (congestible) public good for which
exclusion is possible. Tiebout (1956) showed how the optimal size of local jurisdiction can be
reached when consumer-voter are fully mobile. In his paper, the congestible and excludable
characteristics are assumed implicitly.1 A club is defined by Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) as
‘a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following:
production costs, the members’ characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable
benefits’. In the past 50 years, club theory has been developed in many directions and we are
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Scotchmer (2002): ‘local public goods’, which blends group formation with geography and sometimes with
voting mechanisms. Thus local public goods can be treated as a special case of club goods.

2
most interested in these two directions: the first one is the development in private provision
of club goods; the second one is the development in the interaction among clubs.
The first direction is a discussion about the difference of club production and private
production: some authors even argue that they are equivalent and clubs can be replaced by
private firms. (Berglas, 1976) Some authors see the possible separation of production and
provision of club goods, which is the theoretical base of the popular practice of contracting
out government services in the local jurisdictions in the United State after 1980s. (Musgrave,
1959; Oakerson, 1987; Warner & Hebdon, 2001) Thus clubs can outsource their production
to outside producers, such as private firms, non-profit organization, or other clubs, etc.
However, as we’ll show later, the literature also shows that many governmental services have
to be produced and provided within the public sectors. There are reasons such as retaining
public control, market failure for the goods already, the complexity of public service delivery,
and the limits of market approaches, etc. (Oakerson, 1987; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Parks
& Oakerson, 1993; Lowery 1998; de Leon & Denhardt 2000; Warner & Hebdon, 2001;
Hefetz & Warner, 2004). Although these are not our focus in this paper, they are very
important for our model: they’ll provide the support from the real world for one of our
model’s fundamental assumptions as we’ll show in the second part of the paper: the club
goods in our model are assumed to be produced and provided only by clubs. Other
alternatives are not our concern in this paper.
The second direction is our main interest. The development in the interaction among
clubs has two interesting literatures: one is about the trading of private goods among clubs;
the other one is about the sharing of club goods among clubs (specifically, sharing
uncertainty and risk among clubs) (Sandler, Sterbenz, & Tschirhard, 1985; Sterbenz &
Sandler, 1992). It seems natural that there should be a theory about trading of club goods
among clubs following this direction. However, surprisingly we can find few research of it.
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Are there any reasons that such a theory can’t be developed, or can a club good be traded
among clubs at all? This question boggled us for quite some time. In the end, we overcame
this problem with the help from another literature: New Public Management theory (NPM).
This literature shows that there are many, very popular and common, of trading local public
goods among local jurisdictions. We are excited at the ‘evidence’ in the real world that
supports the idea of developing a theory of trading of club goods among clubs, and such a
theory should be able to rationalize this kind of intergovernmental behavior theoretically in
return and even provide help to correct those old views such as putting intergovernmental
contracting into the category of privatization.
New Public Management (NPM) that rises from 1980s (Hood, 1991) is a global
phenomenon that emphasized deregulation, downsizing, and outsourcing (Cooper, 2003).
Outsourcing (Contracting out) is that government agencies provide services to the public by
employing private firms, nonprofit organizations, or even other governments. Contracting out
is the commonest form of privatization (Rehfuss, 1989). Most economists treat contracting
out as part of privatization, however, a few authors point out “Another myth about
government contracting is that it is something that only happens in conjunction with the
private sector” (Lavery, 1999) and argued that “the failure of past studies to distinguish intermunicipal cooperation from private sector is serious flaw” (Kodrzychi, 1994, 1998; Lopezde-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1995; Warner & Hebdon, 2001). Actually, according to
ICMA data the contracting among governments is very common and about 10% of
privatization is intergovernmental contracting out. It is called as intergovernmental
contracting, agreements, or cooperation, etc. One of the well-known cases is the Lakewood
Plan in the LA county, CA.2 Obviously, this kind of intergovernmental contracting has

2

For details of the Lakewood Plan, see Lavery’s ‘Smart Contracting for Local Government Services’ (Lavery,
1999).
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nothing to do with private sectors and should not be put into the category of privatization.
Thus the theories of privatization might not be appropriate to explain it either.
Some economists do try to give intergovernmental contracting economic reasons:
economies of scale, competition brought by establishing a quasi market, and higher
government efficiency when managing outside organization, etc. (Ostrom, Tiebout , &
Warren, 1961; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Stein, 1990; Lavery, 1999; Savas, 2000; Jang &
Feiock, 2003) According to ACIR (1985), the reason for entering an IG service contract:
economies of scale (52%), the need for a larger area (38%), a lack of facilities (32%).
(Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991) However, all of these seem to be based on intuition and seldom
have been proven or illustrated by sound theories. A lack of a theory causes many
misunderstandings of intergovernmental cooperation: such as not being able to see the real
reasons, mistreating it as part of privatization, and ignoring its effects on jurisdiction
formation, etc. Even for those literatures that separate it as an independent category from the
other governmental restructuring practices, it’s still treated the same way in terms of
analytical methodology. This might reflect that although the authors recognize the difference,
they can’t find a better way to handle it. Apparently, a theory is needed here. On the other
hand, as we recall our above brief review of club theory, there is also a lack of a theory of
trading club goods in the literature of club theory. Now it seems very natural for us to link
these two literatures together: is there a theory of clubs that can be applied to this kind of
intergovernmental cooperation? The theory of trading of club goods in this paper, as a joint
product of these two literatures, is a step toward this effort.3

3

Most of examples here are from the NPM literature and are about governments, however we think our theory
should be able to be used to analyze general clubs such as golf courses, swimming pools, fishing, etc., as long as
they meet our assumptions.
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A Model for Clubs with Trading Club Goods
In this section, we will try to build a model for clubs with trading of club goods. However,
before that, we think we must present an unsolved theoretical issue that is ignored by most
economists till now. It can be called as the problem of non compatibility of collective
consumption and production in a club without trading. We’ll illustrate the problem by
comparing Tiebout (1956) to Buchannan (1965) as follows.
First, let’s take a look at the Tiebout’s definition of optimal local public good size: ‘This
optimum is defined in terms of the number of residents for which this bundle of services can
be produced at the lowest average cost. This, of course, is closely analogous to the low point
of a firm’s average cost curve.’ In another word, Tiebout argued that an optimal size (of local
public good) should meet with the production efficiency of the club good, i.e. a production
level associated with the lowest average cost of the production function. Tiebout tried to use
the cost to constrain the size of local public goods. However, for pure public goods, the size
will go to infinite no matter what kind of cost functions or what the fixed cost is. The reason
is that for pure public goods, there is no need to increase the production when the size is
increasing. The only possible reason, which should be also an underlying assumption of
Tiebout’s paper, is the crowdedness of local public goods, i.e., local public goods is subject to
crowdedness. Thus we see a connection or fundamentally equivalence between Tiebout and
Buchannan. Regarding determining the size of club (or local jurisdictions, etc), Buchannan’s
club model integrated with the crowdedness is more persuasive. However, we also find that
the attention paid to cost function and production efficiency by Tiebout is interesting: do we
need to pursue the lowest average cost when we determine the optimal size? If not, is this
optimal size also optimal in terms of production efficiency?
In Buchannan’s model, the objective function is the individual utility function with the
income constraint. The forms of cost function are unimportant and not specified. However,
we can’t find reasons why the outcome of maximizing individual utility will automatically

6
reach the lowest average cost. If the production and provision is separated and done by
competitive private firms and local governments or clubs respectively, the problem could be
solved. However, for those local public goods/club goods produced and provided both by
local governments/ clubs, in general the problem exists. As Deacon (1979) argued: ‘Under
traditional supply, with services produced in local government bureaus or departments, scale
(the size of the population served) may influence both production costs and costs of collective
consumption (i.e. group decision-making costs). Presumably, the population size of such
jurisdictions evolves as a product of both influences. With both activities (collective
consumption and production) operated at the same level in terms of population, there is no
reason to expect that production activities, taken separately, are efficiently scaled. … If
demand expression and production are separated across a market the two activities may reach
efficient scales separately.’ Thus it seems for us that there is a possible way to solve the
problem of non compatibility of collective consumption and production: a model
emphasizing on cost function and allowing for trading of club goods. These ideas are very
important for our model. Crowdedness of collective consumption, cost function of
production, and trading of club goods are three basic constituents integrated in our model,
which maximizes individual utility of consumption and also seeks to get a lowest average
provision cost at the same time.4 In terms of general equilibrium, we believe such a model
will give us an optimum superior to traditional ones without trading of club goods.5
We will start with the classic clubs without trading. Then the concept of trading of club
goods will be introduced and a model of trading of club goods will be built. In the process of

4
As we’ll see later, the average provision cost has two components: own production cost and purchasing cost.
Generally, the lowest average provision cost is not equal to the lowest average cost of the production function.
In some cases of our model, the former is associated with the latter.
5
Please note that our paper only focuses on club goods that have to be produced by clubs, i.e. that couldn’t be
produced by private firms. For those club goods produced by private firms, the provision and production are
separated and assumed by the clubs and the private firms respectively, which has been discussed for long time
by the traditional contracting out theories.
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solving the objective function we’ll ‘establish’ a market for club goods. Several other issues
will be discussed too. We’ll give our assumptions for our model in the beginning.
Assumptions:
1. The society is large enough such that the problem of integer number of clubs can be
ignored. Let the size of the society be N.
2. The society has two kinds of individuals, rich and poor, with the income endowments
of Ir and Ip respectively. ( Ir >Ip) They only differ in income. Furthermore, the size of
the rich is Nr and that of the poor individuals is Np. So we will have N=Nr+Np. Nr and
Np are large enough too.
3. An individual will face the substitutive consumption between X, a private good, and
Y, a club good. Both X and Y are normal goods. The individual has the utility
function u=u(x,y,n), where x is the consumption of X, y is the consumption of Y, and
n is the club size. We’ll have ∂u / ∂x > 0 , ∂ 2 u / ∂x 2 < 0 , ∂u / ∂y > 0 ,
∂ 2 u / ∂y 2 < 0 , ∂u / ∂n ≤ 0 .6
4. We assume the club good can only be produced by clubs. 7
The Start Point: A World without Trading of Club Goods
In this section, we’ll start from the world without trading of club goods, as most literature

has done. The society will form homogeneous clubs. 8 In addition, we assume a cost function
of production of club goods,

. For a typical individual, its objective function can be

described as9
Max
x , y ,n

u( x, y, n)

s.t. x + C ( y ) / n = I

6

The utility function simply fits the classic assumption of decreasing marginal utility for X and Y. The negative
marginal utility is used to reflect of the disutility of crowdedness of the clubs.
7
This assumption will simplify our analysis which focuses on the interaction behaviors among clubs. Please see
Section 1 for the legitimacy of the assumption.
8
It can be proved that the homogeneous clubs are the outcomes of Nash equilibrium under our assumptions.
Intuitively, in the homogeneous clubs, every member is the median voter and reaches his optimal utility level.
Nobody will have incentives to migrate to the other clubs. Without the assumption of infinite population size, it
may not be true.
9
In our model, we assume there is a unit price for private good X. We also assume that the cost of club good is
shared equally by members, regardless of their income levels. The cost sharing scheme is a crucial institutional
arrangement, and other forms of cost sharing scheme, such as cost sharing according to income, etc., will
change the budget condition of the objective function and thus change the outcomes. We suggest further study
could be conducted based on various cost sharing schemes.

8
The solution need to meet with the following FOCs:
u x' / u 'y = n / C y'

(1)

u 'y / u n' = −n * C y' / C

(2)

x + C ( y) / n = I

(3)

As usual, after solving the first order conditions, we can get x*=x(I), y*=y(I), and n*=n(I).
We denote those for the poor as follows: xp*=x(Ip), yp*=y(Ip), and np*=n(Ip). We denote those
for the rich as follows: xr*=x(Ir), yr*=y(Ir), and nr*=n(Ir). Furthermore, we can get the number
of clubs in the society as Nr/nr and Np/np for the rich and the poor respectively.
If both X and Y are normal goods, we will have ∂x * / ∂I > 0 and ∂y * / ∂I > 0 , i.e. as the
income increases, the consumption of Y, y*, and X, x*, will increase. Under some
assumptions, we can get that ∂n * / ∂I > 0 , i.e. the club size will increase along with increase
in income. Thus we have y *p < y r* , and n *p < nr* .10
A traditional club good has a constant-marginal-cost cost function without fixed cost.
However, as we have discussed before, it’s more general to discuss the cost functions with
constant marginal cost, increasing marginal cost, and decreasing marginal cost. What’s more,
the fixed cost will also be very important as we will see in the later discussion of our paper.
In a word, the cost function, C=C(y), can have the characteristics: (1) ∂C / ∂y > 0 ;
(2) ∂ 2 C / ∂y 2 > 0 , ∂ 2 C / ∂y 2 < 0 , or ∂ 2 C / ∂y 2 = 0 ; (3) C (0) = c , c is a nonnegative constant
parameter.

10

Please see the appendix for details.

9

CASE 1: cost function with increasing marginal cost

In the case of increasing marginal cost, we will have ∂ 2 C / ∂y 2 > 0 . That’s to say, the
more the club good the club produces, the higher the marginal cost will be.
As we can see from above, y *p < y r* , thus we will have C ' ( y *p ) < C ' ( y r* ) , i.e. the marginal
production cost of the poor clubs is lower than that of the rich ones. 11
This can be demonstrated on Figure 1.12 The rich and the poor have the same utility
function and thus they will face the same indifferent curves. On the other hand, they also face
the same cost function. The marginal cost is equal to the slope of the tangent line on the
production possibility curve at the optimal point.
Now, it can be known that the poor clubs can produce an additional unit of club goods
with a lower incremental cost than the rich. Thus it’s possible for the poor clubs to produce
more and sell some club goods to the rich clubs, while the rich clubs produce less and
purchase some from the poor ones. This kind of trading between the rich and the poor will
lead to a Pareto improvement in economic efficiency.

11
We assume both clubs have the same cost function C(y), since it’s reasonable to assume that the technology is
accessible for everyone. When the cost functions can vary according to geography, income, etc., we can get
more general results which fit the real world better. However, to simply our analysis, we will assume the same
cost function for every club through our paper.
12
The individual indifferent curves are conditional on club size. To simplify our illustration, we’ll ignore the
difference in club size. In this graph and the following graphs in this paper, we’ll ignore the process of
adjusting optimal club size.
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CASE 2: cost function with decreasing marginal cost

In the case of decreasing marginal cost function, we will have ∂ 2 C / ∂y 2 < 0 . That’s to
say, the more the club produces, the lower the marginal cost will be.
As we can see from above, y *p < y r* , thus we will have C ' ( y *p ) > C ' ( y r* ) , i.e. the marginal
cost of the poor clubs is higher than that of the rich
In this case, it is more efficient for the rich clubs to produce an additional unit of club
good. The poor can purchase some from the rich with cheaper cost. The trading of club good
in this case will also lead to a Pareto improvement in economic efficiency. This case has been
discussed by much literature as the scale economy of production of club goods.
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CASE 3: cost function with constant marginal cost

In the case of constant marginal cost, we’ll have C ' ( y ) = 0 . That’s to say, all the clubs
have the same marginal cost no matter how much they produce. It seems that it doesn’t
matter who produce and how much they produce. However, if we consider the fixed cost,
there is still room for trading- the society will be better off if there are fewer producers and
thus save some fixed cost. The results here are quite similar to the case with decreasing
marginal cost.13

13

We can think when the fixed cost is high enough, the small clubs will have no ability to produce it. The only
way to consume the club good is to purchase club goods from big clubs or dissolve the small clubs and join the
big clubs. We’ll discuss it in details later.
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A Model of Trading Club Goods
From the analysis of the first part, we know that it is possible for trading club goods

among clubs. In this part, we will continue to develop the trading model. In the previous
classic models without trading among clubs, the incentive for grouping is to share the cost by
consuming club goods together; the disincentive for grouping is the crowdedness of
consumption caused by club members. We’ll discuss the trading behaviors following up the
previous analysis. Now let’s suppose the clubs will trade certain amount of club goods. Let
the amount of own production is y0, then the trading amount is y1=y-y0. When y1 is positive,
it represents the amount purchased in; when y1 is negative, it represents the amount sold out;
when y1 is 0, there is no trade taking place.
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CASE 1: cost function with increasing marginal cost
individual’s problem

First let’s focus on the cost function with increasing marginal cost. Suppose the purchase
price of y1 is p. Now we have the individual objective function:
Max u ( x, y, n)
x , y ,n

s.t. x + C ( y 0) / n + y1 * p / n = I
y = y0 + y1

p = C ' ( y0)
The purchase price p needs to be equal to the marginal cost of own production, C' (y0) .
This is because additional own production will be cheaper than purchasing if the price is
higher than the marginal cost of production. That’ to say, p = C' (y0) . We can let its inverse
function as y0 = h( p) . If we assume that p is exogenous, we can derive the first order
conditions:
u 'y − u x' * p / n = 0

(4)

u n' + u x' * [C (h( p )) / n 2 + y1* p / n 2 ] = 0

(5)

x + C (h( p )) / n + y1* p / n = I

(6)

Now we have three equations (4)-(6). The first one can be rewritten as
u 'y / u x' = p / n = MC y / MC x

, i.e.

MRS y , x = MRTS y , x

, which is the provision constraint of club

goods. The second one can be rewritten as

u n' / u x' = −[C (h( p)) / n 2 + y1* p / n 2 ] == MC n / MC x , i.e. MRSn, x = MRTSn , x , which is the
admission constraint for the club. The third one is the budget constraint for the club. Now we
have four unknown variables, x, y1, n with three equations. We can solve x,y1, and n.
Assume they are as follows respectively,

14
x*=x(p,I)

(7)

y1*=y(p,I)

(8)

n*=n(p,I)

(9)

(and y*= y1*+y0= y1*+h(p))
From (8), we can have y1*=y(p,I). Let its inverse function as p=f(y1,I), which shows that
when I is given, p and y1 depend on each other.
Definition: when y1>0, f is an individual demand function for the club good. When y1<0,
it is an individual supply function of the club good. When y1=0, the club has no demand or
supply of the club good in the market.
the society’s problem

For a given price p, we will have the y1=f-1(p,I). As we summing up all of the demand/
suppply of club goods in the society given the price, we will get the social demand/supply of
club goods.
D=∑y1i=∑ f-1(p,Ii) when y1i>0;
S=-∑y1i=-∑f-1(p,Ii) when y1i<0. (i is the index of clubs.)
Thus, for social demand function we can get
∂D / ∂p = ∑ ∂y1i / ∂p = ∑ (∂y i / ∂p − ∂y 0 i / ∂p )

From p=C’(y0*), we can get ∂y 0 / ∂p > 0 , i.e. as p increase, part of purchased club good
will be replaced by own production. Since Y is a normal good, as the average cost (of own
production and purchase14) increases, both the income effect and substation effect will give
us ∂y / ∂p < 0 . In a word, as p increases, y0 will increase, and y and y1 will decrease. Thus,
we have

∂D / ∂p < 0 , where D>0.
14

Measured by average production and price, respectively, and both are increased.

(10)
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Thus, for social supply function we can get
∂S / ∂p = −∑ ∂y1i / ∂p = −∑ (∂yi / ∂p − ∂y 0 i / ∂p)

We have ∂y 0 / ∂p > 0 . The direction of ∂y / ∂p ambiguous because it will depend on the
income effect and substation effect: the former will have a positive effect on own
consumption y and the latter will have a negative effect. Only in few cases that most club
good is produced to sell will the income effect overwhelm the substitution effect plus the
effect of increase in own production (or ∂y 0 / ∂p > 0 ). Thus, in general we will have:

∂S / ∂p > 0 , where S>0.

(11)

Proposition 1: When the price equal to the marginal cost of club production before trading,
the club has not formed supply or demand for club good; When the price is higher than that
marginal cost, there is a supply of club good from the club; When the price is lower than that
marginal cost, there is a demand for club good from the club.
If we let own production of club goods without trading be y0^, and the associated
marginal cost is C’(y0^), it will be easy to get:
y1=0, y=y0=y0^, as p=C’(y0^);
y1>0, y0<y0^<y, as p<C’(y0^);
y1<0, y0^<y0, y<y0, as p>C’(y0^).
Now let’s go back to the assumption that allows for two income groups. In the previous
part, we have shown that under some assumptions the pre-trading production of club goods
for the poor will be less than that of the rich, i.e.
C ' ( y 0 ^p ) < C ' ( y 0 ^r )

y 0 ^p < y 0 ^r

and furthermore, we can get

. If there exists an exogenous market price for club good, then we’ll have:

For the poor clubs, the aggregated demand/supply is:
Dp=Np/np* f-1(p,Ip), when

p < C ' ( y 0 ^p )

;
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Sp=Np/np* f-1(p,Ip), when
Dp=Sp=0, when

p > C ' ( y 0 ^p )

p = C ' ( y 0 ^p )

;

.

For the rich clubs, the aggregated demand/supply is:
^
Dr=Nr/nr* f-1(p,Ir), when p < C ' ( y 0 r ) ;

^
Sr=Nr/nr* f-1(p,Ir), when p > C ' ( y 0 r ) ;

Dr=Sr=0, when p = C ' ( y 0 r ) .
^

a market for club goods

The demands and supplies derived in the above part can be illustrated in Figure 4. In
Figure 4, when the price P for club good is higher than marginal cost of own production of
club good, C’(y0r^) and C’(y0p^) for rich clubs and poor clubs respectively, there will form a
supply for club good in the market: Sr and Sp for rich clubs and poor clubs respectively. On
the other hand, when the price P is lower than marginal cost of own production of club good,
C’(y0r^) and C’(y0p^) for rich clubs and poor clubs respectively, there will form a demand
for club good in the market: Dr and Dp for rich clubs and poor clubs respectively. As we
horizontally sum up Sr and Sp, we’ll get the market supply curve S=Sr+Sp; meanwhile, as we
horizontally sum up Dr and Dp, we’ll get the market supply curve D= Dr+Dp. As the demand
for club goods is equal to the supply, i.e. S=D, there is the equilibrium of the market, (P*,
Q*). We can see obviously that at the equilibrium, the market supply is from the poor clubs,
and the demand is from the rich clubs. This is consistent to our analysis in the previous
section.
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For mathematical solutions, we’ll need to solve Equations (4), (5) and (6) for every clubs
and get the individual supply/demand functions of club good given the price of club good.
After solving equation S=D and getting the equilibrium price and quantity in the market, we
can go back to get the club size, production, consumption and trading amounts of club good.
There exists a unique solution.15
Definition: As we allow for the trading of club good, given a certain price, the society
will form the demand force on club good as individual clubs want to purchase the club good
for the given price, which can be called as the demand on club good. At the same time, the
supply of club good is formed as some clubs want to sell part of their club good. Thus there
will be an equilibrium point, on which the demand and the supply are equal and the market

15

Proof: let F(p)=S(p)-D(p). Then we have

Furthermore, we have
unique solution for F(p)=0.

, i.e. F is a monotonic increasing function.
, and

, thus there exists a
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price and amount of club good in the market are determined. This is a market for club goods.
16
When we pull the graphs above together, we can get a graph illustrating the formation of
the market as shown in Figure 5. Now we start from area III, clubs are faced with a cost
function with increasing marginal cost. Without trading the amount of club good produced by
the poor and the rich clubs will be
C ' ( y 0^p )

y 0^p

^

and y 0r , which are associated with the marginal cost

^
and C ' ( y 0r ) in area II respectively. Every output level of club good is associated

with a marginal cost. In area II, we have an increasing marginal cost function, this give
us

C ' ( y 0^p ) < C ' ( y 0^r )

. As we have shown above, the equilibrium price has to be within this

range. Through P=MC, we connect the area II to area I. Every price within

C ' ( y 0^p )

and

C ' ( y 0^r ) is associated to a demand and a supply. As the demand equal to the supply of club
good in the market, there is the equilibrium (P*, Q*). The equilibrium price P* will go to
determine the marginal cost and the production of club goods in area II. The equilibrium
price P* will change budget constraints, and so change the optimal choices of clubs. In the
end, the sum of sale of the club good will be equal to the sum of purchase of the club good,
and furthermore, equal to the equilibrium quantity Q* . In this process of adjusting price and
production, the club size will be adjusted simultaneously.17

16

Scotchmer (2002): club theory is a theory of general equilibrium, which tries to maximize the individual
utilities. The finding of a market of club good is an attempt toward this direction.
17
As we refer to it, we’ll ignore the adjusting process of club size. However, this will not affect our illustration.
In the graph, we also assume that all gains from trading are used to consume private goods. In fact, club size and
consumption bundle will be adjusted in the process toward the equilibrium.
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We can prove the following lemmas:
(1) The higher the price is, the higher utility the seller will have and the lower utility the
buyer will have. This is because the higher price will bring the seller more revenue and also
profit from selling club good, while it will increase the cost of the buyers.
(2) The equilibrium price is limited to the area between the marginal production costs
before trading, i.e. C ' ( y 0 ^p ) < p < C ' ( y 0 ^r ) . It can be gotten directly from the above
analysis.18
(3) The population size is important. The larger population is, the more clubs can be
formed. Thus the demand/supply will increase. Increase in poor population will increase the
supply and reduce the equilibrium price. Increase in rich population will increase the demand
and raise the equilibrium price.

18

We’ll expect a smooth demand and supply curve with no constraint on the equilibrium if we allow for varying
in income and cost function.
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(4) The income increase of the rich will increase the demand and raise the equilibrium
price, and vice versa. The income increase of the poor will decrease the supply and raise the
equilibrium price, and vice versa. This is because club good is normal good.
(5) After trading, the consumption of club good for rich clubs will increase because of
price effect. The change in consumption of private good for rich clubs is ambiguous and
determined by the income effect and substitution effect from the price change of club good.
The change in size of rich clubs is ambiguous too. The change in consumption of club good
for poor clubs will be ambiguous and determined by the income effect from selling and price
effect of own consumption of club good. The consumption of private good for poor clubs will
increase because the income effect and price effect. The change of club size of poor clubs is
ambiguous too.
(6) The market for club goods reaches its equilibrium status, and the clubs are stable. The
equilibrium price and quantity of club good in the market, as well as club sizes, production,
consumption and trading amounts of each club maximizes the individual utility function, so
each individual also reach its best situation and nobody will have incentives to move. Thus
our solution is a NE solution under our assumptions.
a discussion about fixed cost

In our cost function, we have C(0)=c. i.e. c is the fixed cost. Little literature have taken
serious consideration in the fixed cost. However, as we will show in the following, the fixed
cost affects greatly the formation of clubs. For example, some small clubs might not be
economic to exist anymore if the fixed cost is significant.
In our individual objective function in the analysis of individual’s problem , we
circumvent the problem of fixed cost by assuming that the clubs will continue to produce
until its marginal cost equal to the market price. Actually there should have a start point to
produce for the clubs. The following proposition will be used to define it.
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Proposition 2-A: A necessary condition for the clubs to produce is that the market price
for the club good will not be lower than the lowest average cost of the cost function for the
club good.
Proof: Hold the assumption in Case 1. In addition, let’s assume p<Min(ATC). Suppose
now the clubs produce y amount of club good and its member’s consumption bundle is (y’,x’).
Then the budget constraint is x+y*p<=x’+y’*p=I’. Now we can find an available budget
constraint x+y*p=I. In the following, we’ll prove that I’<I.
TC(y’)=y’*ATC(y’)>y’*p. Thus x’+y’*p<x’+TC(y’)=I, i.e. I’<I. So we prove that if
p<Min(ATC), there will be a better solution than the one get from the analysis of individual’s
problem. In the new position, the club will purchase all the club good with the market price p.
We will find that this is true for both the rich and the poor clubs. Thus, all clubs want to
purchase from the market with the price and nobody want to produce. The market will fail if
the price is fixed as p<Min(ATC).
Intuitively, the proposition means if the price is too cheap, it will be more economic to
purchase than to produce for all clubs. One important implication of this proposition is that
when the fixed cost is very significant in the cost function, even if the MCs are significantly
different between rich and poor clubs before trading, i.e. there exists the possibility of trading
club goods, the market can’t be formed: to avoid the fixed cost of producing, everybody
becomes purchaser and nobody wants to produce club good. In this case, only a non-market
arrangement among clubs can solve the problem and realize the mutual benefit trading of
club good. From this proposition, we can deduce another proposition directly:
Proposition 2-B: If the market price derived from the section of a market for club goods is
higher than or equal to the lowest average total cost of the cost function, then the equilibrium
is stable. If the market price is lower than it, the formation of clubs will follow without
trading club goods with C(y)=min(ATC)*y. The difference between optimal y and ATC-
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1(Min(ATC)) will be the amount of club goods traded. (The positive difference means
purchase and forms a demand, and the negative means sells and forms a supply.) There may
exist some clubs who are pure purchasers to balance the aggregated supply and demand. In
the equilibrium the ATC=MC, and might not be within

C ' ( y 0^p ) and C ' ( y 0^r )

.

Proof: From the section of a market for club goods, we know that there exists a unique
price p such that D( p) = S ( p) if we don’t consider the fixed cost. If p is higher than or equal
to the lowest average total cost of the cost function, nobody has incentive to quit production
and become pure buyers. Thus the equilibrium is table. ( See Proposition 2-A and its proof.)
When the fixed cost is included and the market price is lower than the lowest average cost,
from Proposition 2-A, we know that the clubs will not produce anymore. Thus the price in the
market needs to be raised, say to be p~>=min(ATC). However, from (10) and (11), we can
~
~
get S ( p ) − D ( p ) > 0 , i.e. the society has a net positive supply. There exists a dilemma

between economic production and market efficiency: on one hand, the price has to be raised
for economic production; on the other hand, the market can’t be liquated with the price. The
only way is that some of the clubs who are suppliers before will quit production and become
pure buyers. Since when the price is equal to min(ATC), it will not be different whether the
clubs get the club good by purchase or production, some clubs will voluntarily quit
production and become pure buyers, till p~ is raised to min(ATC). If the price continue to
raise and p~>min(ATC), it will better for the poor clubs to produce than to purchase because
p~=MC>ATC when p~>min(ATC) and poor clubs can gain from producing to sell, which
will increase the supply and pull back the price. In conclusion, when p~=min(ATC), nobody
wants to change their decision anymore. The outcome is Nash equilibrium.
Directly following proposition B, we can get the lemmas:
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(1) If there is no fixed cost, the formation of clubs will follows the section of a market for
club goods . The proof is quite straightforward. When there is no fixed cost, ATC<MC=p. so
the budget x’+y’*p=I’ is better than x+y*p=I. The clubs have no incentive to (x’,y’).
(2) In equilibrium, every production unit has the same production, which equal to MC1(p), where p is market price.19
(3) There exists a production floor. Proof: since we know that p>=Min(ATC), the
production y0=MC-1(p)>= MC-1(min(ATC)). The production floor of

can

be called as the economic production constraint for the clubs.
(4) The increase of population size will not influence the equilibrium price directly, but
will increase the total traded amount in the market. The population size affects the
equilibrium by adjusting the demand and the supply.
(5) The existence of non-negative profit in the long run for club with selling.
Proof: The above two propositions not only illustrate the formation of clubs and the
equilibrium, but also connect the theory of clubs to the theory of firm. If we compare clubs to
firms, the two propositions ensure the clubs have non-negative profit from selling club good
in the market (p~=MC>=ATC when p~>=min(ATC) ). New firms can be created in a market
with a positive economic profit, which lead to the zero economic profit in the long run.
However, new clubs can’t be created because everybody has been in some club already. On
the other hand, nobody wants to sell more club good because all people have already
maximized their utilities. Thus, the non-negative profit of clubs with selling can exist in the
long run.
The graph in Figure 6 will be used to illustrate the above deduction. In Figure 6-1 we
demonstrate a poor club with selling sell when p>Min(ATC). We can see that it has no
19

This is a special result when the club has the same cost function. The production of different type clubs can be
variable if we allows for difference in cost function, which may be affected by income, geography, or even club
size in the real world.
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incentive to change to pure buyer because that’ll lower its budget line and the utility level. In
Figure 6-2, we demonstrate a rich club that is a purchaser before considering the fixed cost.
Then after considering the fixed cost, it will become pure buyer so that its budget line and
utility level will go up because the market price is low than Min(ATC). However, as we have
talked before, the price will increase till Min(ATC). As shown in Figure 6-2, before
considering fix cost, the rich club is a buyer and producer (Status I); After considering fix
cost, it will become pure buyer at first (Status II); In the end, after adjusting price in the
market, it will go to Status III, where it’s no difference for it to buy or sell. We can see that in
Figure 6-1 the seller can earn a profit from selling because p>ATC.
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the effect on welfare and individual consumption

Based on the above analysis, we can see that comparing to traditional club theory, all the
clubs trading in a market for club goods will be better off (i.e. jump to higher indifferent
curves).
After trading, the consumption of club good for rich clubs will increase and the
consumption of private good for poor clubs will increase. The change in consumption of
private good for rich clubs and the change in consumption of club good for poor clubs are
ambiguous and determined by the income effect and price effect. The change in size of both
rich and poor clubs is ambiguous too.
Furthermore, with simple proof, we can prove nobody wants to move to the clubs of
different income levels, i.e. homogeneous clubs are NE.
Proof: In equilibrium in the market, the price p for club good is given by the market. Let’s
assume some individuals be forming groups to consume the club good together and the group
decision is determined by majority rule. For heterogeneous clubs, let’s assume the decision
maker (or median voter) be with income Im. Then the amount of club good to produce,
consume, sell or purchase will be determined by equations (4), (5) and (6), which can give us
solutions of

(from equations (7), (8), and (9)), all of which depend on Im. The

decision maker’s utility level will be
income Ii Im, his utility level is

. However, for a club member with
, where

.
Now suppose that the individual with income Ii is currently in a homogeneous club, then
its utility level will determined by itself,
under budget constraint. We’ll have

, which maximizes the utility
, because both have the same utility function and

budget constraint and the former maximizes the utility function. Even when Ii=Im, we still
have

. Thus, we prove that in equilibrium all club members in homogeneous clubs
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have no incentive to move to other clubs no matter homogeneous or heterogeneous clubs. i.e.
Homogeneous clubs are NE.
the difference between the market for club good and the market for private good

In the section of a discussion about fixed cost, we connect club theory to firm theory by
the economic production constraint. In this section, we will illustrate the difference between
the markets for club goods and those for private goods.
(1) The agents in the market for club good are individual clubs, or a group of people,
while the agents in normal market are firms and individuals. A club can be the producer, the
purchaser/seller, or both. A club is always a consumption unit. Clubs as sellers keep part of
production for their own consumption, and clubs as purchasers may produce some club goods
for themselves. For example, in the Lakewood Plan, each city of Los Angeles County can
contract with the county or other appropriate agencies for municipal services for the city as a
whole; it also has the option of producing municipal services for itself. In the private market,
the firms produce and sell out all the products, and the individuals purchase and consume the
products.
(2) In a private good market, firms form the supply of the private good, and individuals
form the demand. In a club good market, demand and supply are both formed by clubs.
Whether a club forms a demand or supply depends on its own characteristics and the other
clubs’.
(3) Club goods are consumed together, while the consumption of private goods is rival
and exclusive to each other.
(4)In a market for private good, the firms produce and sell its product for the purpose of
maximizing profit, and the consumers are trying to maximize individual utilities through
adjusting their consumption bundles. In a market for club good, all clubs try to maximize the
utility of their members. The purpose of trading club goods is to lower the consumption cost
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of the club goods. The equilibrium price in a private market depends on the cost function, and
there is no economic profit for the firms in the long run. However in a market for club good,
the equilibrium price depends on the demand and supply of club good, and the clubs have
nonnegative profit after selling.
membership problem

(1) actual price and shadow price:
In the equilibrium, the actual total cost of the consumption of club good will equal to the
difference between the expenditure of private goods and the income endowment. We call the
average consumption cost of club good as the actual price for the club good. In contrast to the
actual cost, we can call the market price of club good as the shadow price for the club good.
Proposition 3: The shadow price is not lower than the actual prices for the sellers and
buyers. When the shadow price is equal to Min(ATC), the actual price and the shadow price
will be the same for all clubs.
Proof: These results can be deduced directly from our analysis in the section of discussion
about fixed cost. From Proposition 2-A, we know that the shadow price (or market price)
can’t be lower than Min(ATC). When the shadow price is equal to Min(ATC), then the actual
price (Min(ATC)) and the shadow price (or market price) are the same; when it’s higher than
Min(ATC), the shadow price (or market price) will be higher than the actual price (ATC)
because when marginal cost (equal to shadow cost) is higher than Min(ATC), it will higher
than ATC (or the actual price).
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(2) membership vs. fees for nonmember
The difference between actual price and shadow price is important as we analyze the
membership problem in club theory. If we assume that a club provide some amount of club
good for members and sell the extra production to the nonmembers, the actual price and
shadow price can be used to discern members and nonmembers.20 The actual price along
with the consumption amount and club size is used to calculate membership, and the
shadow price is used to calculate the fee for the nonmembers.

We need to point out one limitation here: the fee is paid by another club and generally its
use will depend on its discretion. 21The actual cost of the individuals is amount paid as a
group divided by the group size. Thus although the shadow price is not lower than the actual
price, we can’t know in which club the individual pay less or more per unit for the club good.
The fees changed from nonmember will affect the consumption of both club and private

20

Note: for a club who is purchaser, there is no problem of members and nonmembers.
To extend our model to explain the fee paid by individuals, we might assume the seller sets the fee per person
such that the individuals who want to purchase with the fee actually form an optimal group to consume together.
We need to prove that the fee is optimal for the seller too.
21
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goods, and the club size, as we have discussed in the section of the effect on welfare and
individual consumption.

CASE 2: cost function with decreasing marginal cost

If the cost function has a decreasing marginal cost, the analysis will be relatively simple.
As we have discussed in the first section, the economy of scale will request that all the
production is conducted by single production unit. Similar to the monopoly case, the
difficulty here is how to share the cost or define a price. Marginal cost is not suitable to be the
price anymore.
Proposition 4: if the club sizes are insignificant to the population size, when there is
economy of scale in production, all production will be conducted by one club. The average
cost is a Nash equilibrium price.
Proof: Suppose the total production of club good is Q = ∑ yi , where yi is the
consumption of club good in club i. Now the clubs’ objective function is as that in the first
section with the price p=ATC(Q) and C(y)=ATC(Q)*y. Then we can solve yi as a function of
Q, say yi=g(Q). Then with Q = ∑ yi , we can solve Q and all yi. Since the price p=ATC(Q) is
the lowest price the clubs can find either by producing themselves or buying form the others,
the buyers will be in the market with the price. Now we will prove that for the one seller, it
has not incentive to increase the price. Suppose the seller increases the price to p’>p, then we
can find a Q’<Q such that p’=ATC(Q’). That’s to say, the buyers can form a new production
unit and produce Q’’, Q >Q’’>=Q’, thus the average cost for the buyers group is
p’’=ATC(Q’’), p’>p’’>p. In fact, we can find a p’’ such that Q’’=Q-ys, where ys is the
original producer and seller. So this buyers group will be better off after form a new
production unit with production of Q’’. Now he average production cost of the old production
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unit will become ATC(ys)>ATC(Q’’)=p’. So it’s not economic for the seller to increase the
price. Thus it’s a Nash equilibrium.22
In the literature about club theory without trading, the production of club good is
constrained by consumption (they are equivalent.). The disutility of crowdedness also
prevents the forming of one club for the whole society.23 Thus the economy of scale could
not be made use of. In our model, we don’t have this problem. In Figure 8, we illustrate the
unique production unit for all the clubs. We can see that clubs budget line change from the
production line to a new one with slope equal to ATC(Q) as well as the price of club good.
The utility level is increased, and the consumption of club good is increased. The
consumption of private good is ambiguous since the price effect and income effect have
different directions. The change in club size will is ambiguous.

22

If the seller’s size is significant, then it has some room to increase the price till it equal the ATC when all the
other clubs form a production unit.
23
Kennedy (1990) argued that when economies of scale are so significant relative to population size in the
efficient allocation the entire population is included in a single club. However, such a single club as combination
of production and consumption will incur enormous disutility of crowdedness. After separation of consumption
and production, the production can still be burdened by a single club and the other clubs purchase from this
single club. The trading of club good avoids such kind of crowdedness
disutility from forming a single club for the entire population.
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CASE 3: cost function with constant marginal cost

When the cost function has a constant marginal cost, the problem reduced to that in the
first section with C(y)=c+p*y, where p is the constant marginal cost. If there is no fixed cost,
i.e. c=0, then there is not necessary to trade. The model will be the same as that one in
Buchanan (1965)’s paper.
If there exist a fixed cost, c>0, then the problem will be the same as that in Case 2.
(Although the marginal cost is the same, the average cost is decreasing along the production
increases. It’s similar to the effect of economy of scale, especially when the fixed cost is
high.) In Figure 9, we show when there is a fixed cost and the marginal cost is constant. We
can see that the budget line shifts up to pass through (0,x) with the same slope. The utility
level is increase, and the consumption of club good and private good is increase due to
income effect. Proposition 4 in Case 2 still hold here and the average cost is a Nash
equilibrium price.

33
10 (Essay 1) Figure 9 Club Formation- Constant MC

X
Ii

(yi, xi)

Y
MC
AT
ATC

p

MC
Q=sum(yi)

Y

Conclusions
(1) A summary of formation of clubs with trading

Comparing to clubs without trading, with the available cheaper way to get the club goods,
the welfare, the consumption of club good and the size of the clubs with trading will change.
From the previous analysis, we can know the trading of club goods depends not only on
income and utility function, but also on cost function and population distribution. As a
summary of our previous analysis, we can make a table of the formation of club with trading.
(We will include capacity constraint here to better fit the real world.)
From Table 1, we can see in most cases (except 9 and 11), trading affect the formation
and behavior of clubs. Only in the case of 9 and 11, (fixed cost is insignificant and marginal
cost is constant) the trading is not important. Thus, we can’t ignore the trading behavior as
most literature did.
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1 (Essay 1) Table 1 A Summary of Formation of Clubs with Trading
Market
Marginal
cost
Increasing

With capacity limit24

Without capacity limit
Fixed cost
insignificant25
1
Equilibrium price is
between the pre-trade
marginal costs of rich
and poor clubs
Sellers: poor clubs
Buyers: rich clubs
Both are producers
and produce the same
amount of club good.

Fixed cost
significant
2
Equilibrium price is
equal to Min(ATC).
The producer produce
the amount of club
good with Min(ATC).
It doesn’t matter
whether the clubs
produce, sell, or
purchase. Some clubs
will quit production
and become pure
buyers.

Fixed cost
insignificant
3
Same as 1.

Fixed cost
significant
4
Same as 2.

Decreasing 5

6
Same as 5.

8
Same as 7.

constant

10
Same as 5 and 6.

7
The society will
have several
clubs producing
for all the others.
Each producer
reaches the
capacity limit.
The average cost
is the NE price.
11
Same as 9.

It will be optimal for
one club to produce
for all clubs and the
average cost is the
NE price.
Seller: one club
Purchaser: all the
other clubs

24

9
The average cost is
equal to the marginal
cost. It doesn’t matter
whether the clubs
produce, sell, or
purchase.

12
Same as 7
and 8.

Capacity limit prevent the production of each club from being ‘too big’.
Insignificant fixed cost represents there is no fixed cost or the fixed cost doesn’t large enough to affect the
formation of clubs, while significant one means it has effects.
25
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(2) Club production and a market for club good v.s. those for private good
In the section of A Model of Trading Club Goods, we connect them together and also
distinguish them. In a word, we find the economic production constraint for the club
production and then we find the club good markets under different situations.
(3) A market for club good v.s. private provision of club good.
In our model we illustrate a model for the trading of club goods, or the market for club
good. Many literatures have been done about the private provision of club good. It will be
interesting to compare our analysis to these literatures. The most significant connection of
them is that both treat the production and the consumption separately, which should not be
according to traditional club theories.
The second connection is that in our model, some clubs purchase club good from the
others. The part purchased can be treated as the private provision of club good (from the
other clubs in the market), i.e. our model comprehend the idea of private provision of club
good.
Although these significant connections, there are much more difference between them.
First, the frameworks are different. The private provision club good theory mostly is based on
the idea that the private sector is more efficient and then separates the producers (firms) from
the consumers (clubs), while in our model both producers and consumers are clubs. What’s
more, we allows for the clubs to be both producers and consumers at the same time. This
difference derived the second difference-- the models have different setups. Third, our model
derives the market of club good and gets the equilibrium price and consumption bundle,
which can’t be gotten from the private provision models. Fourth, many literatures of the
private provision theories are still struggling in the problem whether it is better or feasible for
the market to provide the club good. We have no this problem since the market is endogenous
in our model. Especially for those club goods without appropriate private markets, our model

36
shows that there exists another market for them which can improve efficiency. Many case
studies about contracting out government services among governments had already shown us
how this will happen in the real world.
(4) Club as a consumption group v.s. clubs as a production group
Some literature argued clubs are formed by individuals for the purpose of sharing the cost
and many of them assumed that the cost function is constant or decreasing. However, as we
discuss before, this assumption is unnecessary: whether the marginal cost is increasing,
decreasing, or constant, the optimal size can be reached anyway. What’ more, after allowing
for trading among clubs, the cost functions will become complicated and even be dependent
on the market for club good. Thus in general we shouldn’t have this assumption.
Thus the traditional idea that clubs are formed because of economy of scale in production
is in doubt. As we can see from above analysis, the trading of club goods also separates the
production from the clubs when they are pure purchasers. So the only reason for club’s
formation is the sharing of consumption. Thus we can give a definition for club: a group
which is formed for the purpose of sharing the consumption of the club goods. The clubs
happen to produce if it’s more efficient. As Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) said: “…the
production of (public) goods and services needs to be distinguished from their provision at
public expense…So, a public agency by contractual arrangements with private firms-or with
other public agencies-can provide the local community with public services without going
into the business of producing them itself…The separation of the provision of public goods
and services from their production opens up the greatest possibility of redefining economic
functions in a public service economy…The separation of production from provision may
also have the consequence of turning local governments into the equivalents of associations
of consumers.”
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(5) A smooth demand/supply curve
In our model, we simplify the problem by assuming there be only two income levels, the
poor and the rich, in the society. However, our main results in this paper will still hold
without this assumption. The key point in our analysis is the marginal cost of the production
of club goods. It should be always hold that the marginal costs are equal through all the clubs
who are producing. With the assumption that the cost functions are the same, all of the
producers will have the same output. The difference between their output and their
consumption is the amount produced to trade. When the income distribution is continuous in
the society, we can get smooth demand/supply curves which are similar to those of the
competitive private market.
(6) Multiple levels of clubs
As we can see, some clubs will connect tightly to each other due to the trading among
them. If we treat them as a special group, it can be called as a big club of small clubs. In the
real world, when the transaction cost is high, it is highly possible that they establish some
institutions (member clubs, state-local jurisdiction, international organization, etc) to be
responsible for the trading. For example, in the state and local economics, this can be some
kind of state and local arrangements, such as revenue sharing scheme, or inter-governmental
transfer scheme, etc. Obviously these institutional arrangements are important and will affect
the formation of clubs.
We have talked several aspects of trading of club goods in the paper, however there are
still many interesting research topics in the future: 1.What happens in a world where the club
goods are non exclusive to nonmembers? 2. What happens if the cost sharing scheme is based
on individual income while the cost is not equally shared by all the members? 3. In the real
world, many clubs are bounded not only by size but also by geographic conditions, thus we
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might want to develop a model to reflect the spatial pattern of clubs with trading and the
associated market for club good.

An Analysis Framework for the Formation of Jurisdictions
As we develop a model of clubs with trading, it can be applied in the jurisdiction
formation directly. As we’ll show later, the trading of club good will affect the formation
process of jurisdictions and the interaction among them.
A Model for Jurisdiction Formation
Suppose there are two groups of people, the rich and the poor, in which the individuals

have the endowment income of Ir and Ip respectively. The population size of the rich group is
nr, and the poor population size is np, i.e. the society’s total population is n=nr+np.
Furthermore, we assume that all people of the same income level will stay in one group.26
Thus they’ll form two jurisdictions bt income level. With these assumptions, we can start to
analyze the interaction between these two jurisdictions.
Now we can have three kinds of jurisdiction structures for the two groups of people:
1. The rich and the poor form their jurisdictions independently, and there is no relation
between the jurisdictions. We call it the parallel structure.
2. The rich and the poor groups form a single jurisdiction. We call it the single structure.
3. The rich and the poor form their own jurisdictions. However, there is some kind of
cooperation between them, such as sharing or trading local public goods. In many cases,
for the purpose of better cooperation, the two jurisdictions will form a higher level
jurisdiction in charge of the cooperation. We call it the dependent structure.

26

The literature in migration had shown that the same type of residents tend to stay together in the real world.
With this assumption, we try to analyze the interaction among different groups.
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If we assume the individual’s consumption of the private good X is x, and that of
consumption of the local public good Y is y.27 The objective functions of the residents in the
jurisdictions with the jurisdiction structures above are as follows respectively:28
1. parallel structure:

Max u p ( x, y )
x, y

s.t. x + C ( y ) / n = I
Thus we can solve the objective function and get the optimal choices are
x sr , y sr , and u sr. for the rich jurisdiction and x sp , y sp , and u sp. for the poor jurisdiction.

2. single structure:
If this case, we assume the majority rule is used to determine the level of local public
goods. When the rich population size is bigger, then the objective function will be:
Max u sr ( x, y )
x, y

s.t. x + C ( y ) / n = I r
nr > n p
x r , y , and u sr1
for the rich residents, where y s1 is the
We can solve it and get s1 s1
consumption of Y for the jurisdiction. For the poor residents, they have no choice,
y s1 , x sp1 = I p − C ( y s1 ) / n, and u sp1 .

When the poor population size is bigger, then the solutions will be
x sr2 = I r − C ( y s 2 ) / n, y s 2 , and u sr2

27

for the rich and

x sp2 , y s 2 , and u sp2

for the poor.

We assume that the local public good Y is exclusive to the residents outside the jurisdiction.
Compared to the objective functions in section 2, we will find that there is not the adjusting process of
jurisdiction size here.
28
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3. dependent structure:
In this case, for the rich jurisdiction, we have
Max u r ( x, y )
x, y
d
r
r
r
s.t. x + C ( y 0 ) / n + y1 * p / n = I ,

y = y0 + y1 .

For the poor jurisdiction, we have
Max u p ( x, y)
x, y
d
p
p
p
s.t. x + C ( y 0 ) / n + y1 * p / n = I ,

y = y0 + y1 .

When the marginal cost function is

Where

r
p
r
p
increasing, p = C ' ( y 0 ) = C ' ( y 0 ) if y 0 , y 0 exist; when it is constant or decreasing,

p = ATC ( y r + y p ).
for the rich and

After solving the objective function together, we can get

x dp , y dp , and u dp

for the poor.

x dr , y dr , and u dr
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Jurisdiction Formation Process
From our analysis in the previous section, we know that the parallel structure is

dominated by the dependent structure. So we only need to compare the latter two structures.
2 (Essay 1) Table 2 Dependent and Single Jurisdiction Structure

Poor group

Dependent structure
u dp

Single structure29
u sip

Difference30
D p = u dp − u sip

Rich group

udr

u sir

D r = u dr − u sir

We will have the following statements:
(1) If both D p and D r are positive, then dependent structure will be dominant.
(2) If both D p and D r are negative, then single structure will be dominant.
(3) If one is positive, and the other one is negative, the dependent structure is dominant if
there is no income transfer between the groups. However it’s possible for the group with
negative difference to pay an amount of money, T, to remedy the other group so that the
two groups can merge to a big single group.31
Statements (1) and (2) are quite straight forward. The two groups have the same tendency
towards either the dependent structure or the single structure. Now let’s see statement (3).

29

When the rich population size is larger, i=1; otherwise, i=2.
Whether the difference is positive or negative depends on two effects: (1) collective consumption efficiency
(or crowdedness of collective consumption); (2) production efficiency. For example, when MC is increasing and
there is no fixed cost, if we don’t consider collective consumption efficiency, then the dependent structure is
preferred because it has lower production cost. However, when we take collective consumption efficiency into
consideration, if both group sizes are far smaller than optimal sizes, then it might be better for them to form a
single group. Thus on one hand they have higher production efficiency to produce separately; on the other hand,
they have higher consumption efficiency to consume the club good together. The final outcome will depend on
the tradeoff of these two effects.
31
In our model we assume that either group has the right to choose its status. If this is not the case, i.e. either
group’s status depends on the agreement of the other group, then we’ll be faced with an opposite case: the group
with positive difference will pay money to the other group and keep it out.
30
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Suppose the rich club transfer T*nr amount of money to the poor. (When T is negative, it
means the rich receives T amount of money from the poor.) T belong to (-Ip,Ir).
Max Ur(x,y, nr+np) if nr>np
s.t. x+c(y)/(nr+np)=Ir-T

We can solve and get

,

, and

, and

,

, where

,

, where

.

Max Up(x,y, nr+np) if nr<np
s.t. x+c(y)/(nr+np)=Ip+
We can solve and get

,

, and

, and

.

Suppose there exists a set of solutions for T, say , within –Ip and Ir, such that
and

, then we will have:
(1) If includes 0, then both groups prefer to the single structure. No intergroup income

transfer is needed. The final outcome is single structure.
(2) If is a positive set, then the rich pays the money to the poor; on the other hand, if is
a negative set, the poor pays the money to the rich. The final outcome is single structure with
intergroup income transfer.
(3) If is empty, then the final outcome is dependent structure.
Conclusions
From the analysis above, we know there are four outcomes of the interaction between the

two groups of people: (A) a dependent structure without income transfer (both groups prefer
to it); (B) a dependent structure without income transfer (one group prefers to it, but the other
one prefers to the single structure); (C) a single structure without income transfer (both
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groups prefer to it); (D) a single structure with income transfer (different preferences to
structures before transfer, but with income transfer, both groups prefer to a single structure).
If a higher level jurisdiction is formed to lower transaction cost of trading or income
transfer, we can have three types of hierarchy government structures:
(1) From outcome (A) and (B), we’ll have a government structure as follows: a higher
level government in charge of trading among local governments which provide local public
good within their jurisdictions;
(2) From outcome (C), we’ll have a government structure as follows: a higher level
government in charge of local public good provision for all people within its jurisdiction.
(3) From outcome (D), we’ll have a government structure as follows: a higher level
government in charge of income transfer among local governments and also in charge of
local public good provision for all people within its jurisdiction;
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Essay 2: Food Consumption in Jamaica: A Household Behavior as well as a
Social Behavior
Literature Review and Motivation
Engel’s curve is used to show the relationship between consumption and income (ceteris
paribus). The literature on Engel’s curve traces back to Engel (1857). Based on surveys of
families’ budgets and spending patterns, Engel found that the income elasticity of the demand
for food was relatively low. This is the well-known Engel’s law: As incomes increase, the
share of expenditures for food declines.
Engel’s curve is important because of its wide application. It can be used to estimate
income elasticity of various household consumptions, including food. It can be used to
measure the economic development level of a region or a country. Poor countries usually
have higher Engel’s coefficients in such studies, and rich countries have lower ones. In
research on poverty, Engel’s curve helps draw a poverty line in a region or a country
(Rowntree 1901, Fisher 1992, Ravallion & Bidani 1994, Boltvinik 1998).
A huge literature has grown up about Engel’s curve. Most of it shares a common
assumption about the independence of consumption behavior. This assumption says, that
people (or a family or a household, etc.) will be unaffected by the behavior of others.
However, the recent literature takes more and more interest in interactive behavior. These
studies in interdependent preferences show that preferences and choices of behavior are
influenced not only by an individual’s own tastes but also by the tastes of others. Such
interactions are called, among others terms, “social norms,” “bandwagons,” “neighborhood
effects,” “peer influences,” “conformity,” and “herd behavior” (Hyman, 1942; Merton, 1957;
Granovetter, 1979; Manski, 2000).
Efforts to estimate the interdependence of preference have absorbed many economists
lately. Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) modeled this interdependence by making current budget
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shares of a household dependent upon mean budget shares in the reference group of this
household. Kapteyn, Geer, Stadt and Wansbeek (1997) modeled it by making parameters in
the Linear Expenditure System (LES) dependent upon current quantities in the reference
group of a household. In our paper, we find that the spatial econometric technique can be
very useful as a way to estimate interdependence. The development of spatial econometrics
enables economists to estimate the magnitude of the interactions among neighbors and thus
has become one of the most popular econometric techniques. It’s been used to study
interdependent preferences in consumer expenditure (Darough, Pollak and Wales, 1983;
Alessie and Kapteyn, 1991; Case, 1991; Kaptyen et. al., 1997), labor supply (Aronsson,
Blomquist and Sacklen, 1999), political science (Smith and LeSage, 2000; Darmofal 2006),
poverty policy (Daimon, 2001), marketing (Yang and Allenby, 2001; Bronnenberg, 2004),
and public finance/taxation (Franzse and Hays, 2005).
This paper uses JSLC 2001 data to create spatial econometric models to estimate an
Engel’s curve for food consumption in Jamaica. Effects to be considered are household
factors (household income, household size, household structure, etc.) as well as the effects of
social factors (income level in the society, neighborhood’s food consumption, etc.). Various
forms of Engel’s curve have been estimated, and this paper uses the Working-Leser share
expenditure system (Working, 1943; Leser, 1963), which has been developed into the widely
used Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) by incorporating price variables (Deaton &
Muellbauer, 1980). The application of the Working-Leser system enables us to compare our
estimation to the recent literature. Meanwhile, a preliminary exploration shows that the
interdependence of household food consumption might exist in terms of Engel’s coefficient,
and the interdependence is ambiguous and inconsistent in terms of food consumption amount
(or its log form). Because we’ll estimate an Engel’s curve for household food consumption
and the other expenditures are not our interest, the Working-Leser system can be simplified
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as (without price variables):
Engel's coefficient = constant + b * log(total income) + c * other variables + residual .
(where b and c are coefficients, the residual is i.i.d.)
The paper is organized as follows: the second section introduces the spatial models and
the model specification; the third section introduces the data and defines the weight matrix;
the fourth section reports the estimations of the spatial models and compares them; the fifth
section discusses and summarizes the results of the estimations; and the last section assesses
the policy implications of our estimations.

Spatial Models and Diagnostics Methods
Spatial Models
Spatial models can be used to estimate the interdependence or correlation among

neighborhoods. The widely used general form of spatial models can be expressed as (SAC):
y = xβ + ρwy + u ,
u = λwu + ε ,

ε ~ i.i.d .
where y is a dependent variable, x is a covariate, and u and ε are error terms. w is a
predefined weight matrix, wy and wu are the spatial lag and spatial error terms. ρ and λ will
measure the spatial correlation (or interdependence) among neighborhoods. A positive
(negative) sign of ρ or λ reflects the positive (negative) spatial correlation among the
neighborhood’s ys or errors. In the spatial models, the weight matrix is crucial, and neighbors
affect each other through the spatial lag and/or spatial error terms.
The interaction among neighborhood behaviors has three possibilities (Manski, 2000).
These are (1) endogenous interactions: neighbors affect each other’s behavior directly; (2)
contextual interactions: the behavior of people is affected by the exogenous variables of their
neighbors; and (3) correlated effects: neighborhoods tend to behave similarly because of
common characteristics or similar environments.
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In empirical work, contextual interactions are typically assumed not to exist. In other
words, researchers assume that people will not be affected by the exogenous variables of their
neighbors. Thus, the interactions of the behaviors among neighbors will be either endogenous
interactions or correlated effects. In the general spatial models described above, the
endogenous interactions can be estimated by the coefficient of the spatial lag term ( ρ ), and
the correlated effects can be estimated by the coefficient of the spatial error term ( λ ).
If λ =0, the spatial model can be reduced to a spatial autoregressive model or to spatial
lag model (SAR):
y = xβ + ρwy + u,
ε ~ i.i.d .
If ρ =0, the spatial model can be reduced to a spatial autoregressive error model or spatial
error model (SEM):
y = xβ + u ,
u = λwu + ε ,
ε ~ i.i.d .
If ρ =0 and λ =0, it’s a normal linear model and the ordinary least square model (OLS)
model is appropriate. However, for spatial models, OLS will be either biased or inefficient. If
the spatial lag term is ignored but ρ isn’t equal to zero, then the OLS estimate will be biased
and inconsistent. Conversely, if the spatial error term is ignored but λ isn’t equal to zero,
then the OLS will be inefficient because of the heterogeneity in errors. The spatial models
can be estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), the generalized method of
moments (GMM) or other econometric methods. However, before estimating the spatial
models, we need to identify the real forms of the spatial models. Several statistical tests for
this are available.
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Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence
Lagrange Multiplier tests
There are two basic LM tests: The first one is a test for spatial lag dependence, and the
other is for spatial error dependence. According to Anselin and Rey (1991), the two LM tests
take the following forms:
LM test for spatial lag dependence:
∧

∧

LM lag = [Ne' W1 y/e' e] 2 [N(W1 X β )' M(W1 X β )/e' e + tr(W1' W1 + W12 )]-1

LM test for spatial error dependence:
LM Error = [Ne' W2 e/e' e]2 [tr(W2' W2 + W22 )]-1
∧

where N is the number of observations, e is the OLS residuals, M = I - X(X' X) -1 X ' , β is
the OLS estimate of β , and W1 and W2 , respectively, are the weight matrixes for the spatial
lag and spatial error terms.
Both tests share the hypothesis (H0) of no correlation ( ρ =0 and λ =0 respectively).
When we reject H0 by either the LM lag test or the LM error test, we can expect either spatial
lag dependence or spatial error dependence. We can use MLE, GMM or other methods to
estimate the specified spatial models.
Robust Lagrange Multiplier tests
One main limitation of the LM tests is that they are nonnested. That is, they will reject H0
even if ρ =0 (or λ =0), if spatial error (or spatial lag) dependence exists λ ^=0 (or ρ ^=0). The
robust Lagrange Multiplier tests overcome this limitation by accounting for any spatial error
(or spatial lag) when testing for spatial lag (or spatial error) dependence. This more robust
LM application also accounts for the noncentrality problem of LM tests. (Anselin, Bera,
Florax, & Yoon, 1996) However, robust LM tests have less reduced power than the LM lag
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(or error) test when no spatial error (or spatial lag) dependence exists. Robust LM tests take
these forms:
Robust LM test for spatial lag dependence:
LM*lag =

(e' W1 y/s 2 - e' W1e/s 2 ) 2
~
(N J1ρ ⋅β ) -1 - t 1

Robust LM test for spatial error dependence:

~
~
LM*Error = [(e'W2 e/s2 - t 2 ) - (NJ1ρ⋅β ) -1 (e'W2 y/s2 )]2 /[t 2 - t 22 (NJ1ρ⋅β ) -1 ]
~
where s 2 = e' e / N , (N J1ρ ⋅β ) -1 = [t1 + (W1 Xβ )' M (W1 Xβ ) / s 2 ] −1 , M = I - X(X' X) -1 X ' ,
~
t 1 = tr(W1' W1 + W12 ) , (N J2 ρ ⋅β ) -1 = [t 2 + (W2 Xβ )' M (W2 Xβ ) / s 2 ] −1 , t 2 = tr(W2' W2 + W22 ) .
Moran’s I test
I=

N e'We
S e' e

Moran’s I test also is used to test for spatial error dependence. However, it is powerful
against both error and lag dependence and consequently should be used conservatively.
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Data: Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions
Data Introduction and Summary
Our data comes from the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2001. It’s a survey of

randomly selected households and contains 1,668 observations. The survey covered 14
parishes, 58 constituencies, and 159 districts. The following is a list of variables we’ll use in
our model:
Engel: Engel’s coefficient of household and equal to total household food consumption
divided by total household expenditure. This is the independent variable.
totfood: Total household food consumption.
totexp: Total household expenditure. In this paper, total household expenditure is
assumed to be equivalent to total household income.
logexp: Equal to the log of total household expenditure.
popdec: Deciles of household’s total per capita consumption in the society. This paper
uses it to reflect the household’s social status.
popexp: Interaction of popdec and logexp.
sex: Gender of the head of household.
logsize: Log of household size (label as size).
marr1-5: Dummy variables for the five indicators of marriage status: “Married,”
“Never married,” “Divorced,” “ Separated,” and “Widowed.”
union1-5: They are dummy variables for five marriage statuses: “Married,” “Common
Law,” “Visiting” “Single,” and “None.”
adsex1-4: Number, respectively, of male adults, female adults, male children, and
female children.

A summary of the data is in Table 1 and Table 2. There are also several graphs. Figure 1
shows the household expenditure structure in Jamaica. Figure 2 displays a pattern of
negative correlation between Engel’s coefficient and household total expenditure, which is
exactly what we expect according to Engel’s law. After the log transform of household total
expenditure, a linear correlation between Engel’s coefficient and household total expenditure
comes up. Meanwhile, we also see that the Engel’s coefficient of a group decreases as
population deciles measured by household total expenditure (or income) goes up.
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3 (Essay 2) Table 1 A Summary of Data (1)
N
Engel
totfood
totexp
size
adsex1
adsex2
adsex3
adsex4

1665
1665
1668
1668
1668
1668
1668
1668

MIN
3.09%
888
7,872
1
0
0
0
0

MAX
93.88%
706,866
4,137,979
28
8
6
7
7

MEAN
48.77%
118,980
284,186
3.42
1.10
1.18
0.61
0.53

4 (Essay 2) Table 2 A Summary of Data (2)
sex

N

Male
Female
union
others
1
2
3
4
5

N

marr
Others
1
2
3
4
5

N

944
719

totfood
117,090
121,223

totexp
285,428
282,838

Engel
49%
49%

19
465
239
288
362
290

totfood
159,076
139,473
140,946
113,823
95,908
98,568

totexp
365,500
369,193
310,404
259,585
226,259
218,388

Engel
48%
45%
51%
48%
51%
51%

6
507
940
18
29
163

totfood
119,088
138,575
110,354
121,147
114,373
107,115

totexp
230,969
366,855
244,539
366,324
312,076
244,862

Engel
53%
45%
51%
40%
42%
49%
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11 (Essay 2) Figure 1 Household Expenditure Structure in Jamaica, 2001
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12 (Essay 2) Figure 2-1 Plots for Totexp, Totfood, and Engel's Coefficient
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13 (Essay 2) Figure 2-2 A Plot for Totexp, Totfood, and Engel’s Coefficient by Popdec

54

Weight Matrix
To account for the neighborhood effect, we used spatial econometric techniques. With its

help, we can determine whether there is an interaction of consumption behavior among
neighbors and the degree of such interaction. To apply spatial econometric techniques,
however, we must first define a suitable weight matrix, which will be used to identify the
neighbors or measure the magnitude of influence among subjects. Most literature defines a
weight matrix either by geographical proximity or by similarity in characteristics (such as
income). For example, in using a weight matrix defined by ge proximity, subjects are
considered connected to each other geographically, and thus the weight matrix is defined by
either sharing the same border or the inverse of the distance among subjects. In our paper, we
want to define a weight matrix that could reflect social connections among households that
group to form a neighborhood/jurisdiction. These households in the same neighborhood
might affect each other’s behaviors for various reasons that we have referred to previously.
Thus, in our paper, we define a neighborhood as consisting of people within a certain
jurisdiction.
Jamaica is divided into 14 administrative regions called parishes. Each of these parishes is
then subdivided into several constituencies (typically four constituencies in a parish:
northwest, north east, south west, and southeast). An enumeration district (ED) is a group of
dwellings established for the national census. Figure 3 describes the Jamaican jurisdictional
structure. In this paper, people living in the same neighborhood are expected to tend to
interact with each other, and EDs are considered a suitable neighborhood for such interaction.
Thus, our paper defines a neighborhood as households within the same enumeration district
(ED).
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14 (Essay 2) Figure 3 Jurisdiction Structure & Weight Matrix

Jamaica

Figure 3:
Jurisdiction Structure
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Measuring the neighborhood effect requires a weight matrix: A unit weight is assigned to
all households within the same district; otherwise, the assigned weight is 0. Then the weight
matrix is standardized so that for each household the sum of the weights is equal to one.
Table 3 is an example of the weight matrix.
5 (Essay 2) Table 3 An Illustration of Weight Matrix defined by Eds
Weight Matrix
ED1: Dwelling 1
ED1: Dwelling 2
ED1: Dwelling 3
ED2: Dwelling 1
ED2: Dwelling 2
ED2: Dwelling 3
…

ED1:Dw
elling 1

ED1:Dwel
ling 2

ED1:Dwel
ling 3

ED2:Dwell
ing 1

ED2:Dwell
ing 2

ED2:Dwel
ling 3

…

0
1/2
1/2
0
0
0
0

1/2
0
1/2
0
0
0
0

1/2
1/2
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1/2
1/2
0

0
0
0
1/2
0
1/2
0

0
0
0
1/2
1/2
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
…

Model Specification and Estimation
Model Specification
We undertook to estimate whether a household’s food consumption as a ratio to total

household expenditure will be affected by the household’s characteristics such as household
income, head of household structure, and other factors and also whether this ratio will be
affected by its neighborhood. Thus, our dependent variable will be the ratio of household
food consumption to household total expenditure, or in other words, the household Engel
coefficient. Our explanatory variables will include variables such as household total
expenditure (household income), household income deciles in the society, household size,
marriage status, union status, and household structure (numbers of adults and children by
gender). The models are also integrated with the spatial (spatial lag/error) terms to estimate
the neighborhood effect. A summary of the factors affecting the household Engel’s
coefficient is as follows:
a. Household factors: log of household income, marriage status, union status, and
household structure. A huge of literature has discussed the effect of household factors on
household consumption behavior.
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b. Social factors: household income deciles in the society; spatial effects from neighbors.
Fan and Abdel-Ghany (2004) tested the importance of integrated permanent and relative
income model in explaining consumer expenditure behavior and argued that both are
important determinants of household expenditure behavior even in the presence of the other.
Thus in our model we will integrate the variable of household income deciles and estimate its
effect on household consumption behavior. The spatial effects have been discussed
previously in this paper.
Diagnostics for Spatial Lag and Spatial Error Dependence
Before we can choose a spatial model for our analysis, we first need to test statistically

for spatial dependence. These tests for spatial dependence use Moran’s I test for spatial
dependence, the LM tests and Robust LM tests for spatial lag and spatial error dependence.
A Preliminary OLS Regression
All of these tests assumed that without spatial dependence, the model would be linear and
OLS would be appropriate. First estimating the model by OLS yields the result shown in
Table 4 in which variables for sex, marr1, marr3, marr4, union1, union2, union3, union4,
adsex2, adsex4 are highly insignificant. Thus, these variables can be removed and a
regression run for a reduced model, as in Table 5, with the result that F test, Root MSE, and
Adjust R-Squared are all improved. Because of this improved performance, the reduced
model will be used in the further steps of diagnosis and estimation of spatial models.
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6 (Essay 2) Table 4 An OLS Estimate
F: 55.37
P>F: <0.00001
Root MSE: 0.12343
Engel
Coefficient
_cons
1.671782
logexp
-0.112315
popdec
0.123040
popexp
-0.008947
sex
-0.003050
logsize
0.096417
marr1
0.001892
marr2
0.026955
marr3
-0.013359
marr4
-0.028455
union1
-0.020555
union2
0.000230
union3
-0.007818
union4
-0.005959
adsex1
0.015117
adsex2
-0.000571
adsex3
0.006069
adsex4
-0.000062

R-Squared: 0.3633
Adj R-Squared: 0.3567
Std. Err
0.175809
0.016671
0.016512
0.001401
0.007874
0.016575
0.019200
0.011360
0.031042
0.025116
0.018552
0.012346
0.011181
0.009977
0.004977
0.005547
0.004790
0.004970

t
9.51
-6.74
7.45
-6.39
-0.39
5.82
0.10
2.37
-0.43
-1.13
-1.11
0.02
-0.70
-0.60
3.04
-0.10
1.27
-0.01

P>|t|
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.699
0.001
0.922
0.018
0.667
0.257
0.268
0.985
0.485
0.550
0.002
0.918
0.205
0.990

7 (Essay 2) Table 5 An OLS Estimate for the Reduced Model
F: 134.32
P>F: <0.00001
Root MSE: 0.12321
Engel
Coefficient
_cons
1.677970
logexp
-0.114510
popdec
0.122163
popexp
-0.008858
logsize
0.095705
marr2
0.036624
adsex1
0.015723
adsex3
0.006690

R-Squared: 0.3616
Adj R-Squared:0.3589
Std. Err
0.170320
0.016189
0.016127
0.001361
0.013343
0.006386
0.003917
0.004325

t
9.85
-7.07
7.57
-6.51
7.17
5.73
4.01
1.55

P>|t|
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.122
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Diagnostics for Spatial Lag and Spatial Error Dependence
Diagnostic tests using Moran’s I, LMs and Robust LM tests for spatial error and spatial
lag dependence were run on the model.32 Moran’s I test yielded a p value lower than 0.001,
which reflects the existence of spatial dependence. Moreover, not only the LM tests for
spatial lag/error dependence, but also their robust counterparts showed a high degree of
spatial lag and error dependence in the model. Accordingly, based on our discussion in the
previous section, we conclude that both spatial lag and spatial error dependence are present to
a significant degree. Thus, a general spatial model (or SAC) as described before is suggested.
8 (Essay 2) Table 6 Diagnostic Tests
Diagnostics Tests
Moran's I
Spatial error:
Lagrange multiplier
Robust Lagrange multiplier
Spatial lag:
Lagrange multiplier
Robust Lagrange multiplier

Statistic
15.145

df
1

p-value
<0.001

224.298
54.997

1
1

<0.001
<0.001

178.938
9.636

1
1

<0.001
0.002

Model Estimation
We used both MLE and GMM to estimate the SAC spatial models.33 At the same time,

for comparison, we also estimate SAR and SEM models. As we can see, the estimated
coefficients of different spatial models are quite similar for both MLE and GMM. However,
when using MLE, we can see that the SAC model has a higher log likelihood than either the
SAR or SEM model. At the same time, when we compare the results with the OLS estimate,
we also find similar estimated coefficients, but the spatial model gives us a much lower
standard error. Thus, we are able to conclude that the SAC model is suitable.

32
The statistical software we used for OLS estimation and diagnosis for spatial dependence is STATA. The
STATA package is sg162: Tools For Spatial Data Analysis, downloaded from http://www.stata.com/stb/stb60.
33 We use MATLAB for our estimation. The MATLAB toolbox is available from “Econometrics Toolbox”
created by James P. LeSage. (http://www.spatial-econometrics.com)
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9 (Essay 2) Table 7 MLE Estimate for SAC, SAR, SEM models
Variable
Const
Logexp
Popdec
Popexp
marr2
Logsize
adsex1
adsex3
Rho
Lambda
R-squared
Rbar-squared
sigma^2
log-likelihood

SAC
1.454668***
-0.102501***
0.119934***
-0.008733***
0.035220***
0.091366***
0.015170***
0.006377*
0.176000***
0.263999***
0.404
0.401
0.014
2696.424

SAR
1.321773***
-0.097878***
0.116896***
-0.008436***
0.036578***
0.088860***
0.014369***
0.006645*
0.328985***
0.348
0.346
0.014
1736.226

SEM
1.555184***
-0.103335***
0.120293***
-0.008811***
0.034160***
0.091153***
0.015376***
0.006173*
0.405982***
0.408
0.406
0.014
1739.173

(*: 15% significant level; **: 10% significant level; ***: 1% significant level.)

10 (Essay 2) Table 8 GMM estimate for SAC, SAR, SEM models
Variable
Const
Logexp
Popdec
Popexp
marr2
Logsize
adsex1
adsex3
Rho
Lambda
R-squared
Rbar-squared
sigma^2

SAC
1.104769***
-0.10208***
0.119744***
-0.008709***
0.035427***
0.091216***
0.015093***
0.006413*
0.201735***
0.230879***
0.403
0.400
0.014

SAR
1.378375***
-0.09758***
0.124798***
-0.00913***
0.037047***
0.089462***
0.014645***
0.006438*
0.21183***
0.389
0.387
0.015

SEM
1.554316***
-0.10326***
0.120548***
-0.00883***
0.034205***
0.091153***
0.015374***
0.00617*
0.399549***
0.407
0.404
0.014

(*: 15% significant level; **: 10% significant level; ***: 1% significant level.)

Then, we can write our estimated model as follows (using the GMM estimate for the SAC
model):
Engel = 1.104769 − 0.10208 ⋅ log exp + 0.119744 ⋅ popdec - 0.008709 ⋅ popexp + 0.035427 ⋅ marr2
+ 0.091216 ⋅ logsize + 0.015093 ⋅ adsex1 + 0.006413 ⋅ adsex3 + 0.201735 ⋅ w ⋅ Engel + u
u = 0.230879 ⋅ u + ε
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When the predicted Engel’s coefficient is plotted against the logexp in Figure 4-1&2, it
captures the trend quite well. The normality plot of the residual also suggests a normal
distribution of the residual.
15 (Essay 2) Figure 4-1 Plots of SAC Estimation-1
A Plot of logexp vs Engel Coefficient:
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E n g e l C o e f f ic ie n t

1

0.5

0

-0.5

8

9

10

11

12
logexp

13

14

15

16

14

15

16

A Plot of Logexp vs SAC's Residual

R e s id u a l

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

8

9

10

11

12
logexp

13

62
16 (Essay 2) Figure 4-2 Plots of SAC Estimation-2
Normal Probability Plot for SAC's Residual
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Discussion and Summary
Effect of Income
As demonstrated by the estimation results (for the SAC model by the GMM estimate), the

coefficient of logexp is -0.10208. At the same time, the interaction term of logexp and
popdec is -0.008709. So the effect of total expenditure (or income) on Engel’s coefficient will
depend on popdec: As popdec increases, the effect of total expenditure becomes larger. The
following table shows how much Engel’s coefficient decreases in each popdec in response to
each 1% increase in total expenditure.
11 (Essay 2) Table 9 Change in Engel’s Coefficient With 1% Increase in Totexp by
Popdec
Popdec

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Change

-0.0011

-0.0012

-0.0013

-0.0014

-0.0015

-0.0015

-0.0016

-0.0017

-0.0018

-0.0019

Effect of Household Structure
(1) The gender of the head of household and the union status have no significant effects.

This negative finding was strongly expressed in the preliminary OLS estimation.
(2) “Never Married” status for a head of household differs significantly from the other
marital statuses (“Married,” “Divorced,” “Separated,” and “Widowed”). These households
will have an Engel Coefficient that is 0.035427 higher than the others, ceteris paribus. This is
a large difference and means that these households spend 3.5% more of their total income on
food.
(3) Household size and structure effect food consumption significantly. The coefficient of
logsize is 0.091216. The effect of an additional household member on Engel’s coefficient is
illustrated in the following graph. As documented by the graph , the effect of additional
members decreases as household size increases. The graph in Figure 5 also shows the
economy of household food consumption: Food consumption doesn’t increase
proportionately to an increase in household size, and thus per capita food consumption will
decrease when household size increases.
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17 (Essay 2) Figure 5 Plot for Marginal Increase in Engel’s Coefficient
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Household Size

We can also see that male members of a household have a positive effect on Engel’s
coefficient. A male adult will increase the Engel’s coefficient by 0.015093 (or increase food
share as a proportion to total household expenditure by 1.51%); a male child will increase the
Engel’s coefficient by 0.006413 (or increase food share as a proportion to total household
expenditure by 0.64%). Neither female adults nor female children have a significant effect.
Effect of Social factors: Income Level in the Society and Neighborhood
The household deciles variable has a very significant effect. It shows that when a

household moves upward from one decile to the next, the Engel’s coefficient will increase by
0.119744, which translates into an 11.97% increase in food share. (Interestingly, the same
decile upward mobility will increase the negative effect of logexp.) And although the popdec
variable increases the Engel’s coefficient, it also accelerates the decrease of Engel’s
coefficient with the increase in log income. This can be described as a typical tendency by
people to decrease the percentage of income they spend on food as income increases, but an
atypical jump in income that moves the same people into an upper decile may be
accompanied by an increase in consumption of food as they indulge because of their higher
status. In the higher deciles, the percentage of income spent on food declines at a faster rate
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than in the lower deciles when the same increase of income in log form is involved, however
it declines at a slower rate when the same increase of income is involved.
We have talked about the improvement in performance gained by adopting the SAC
model for our analysis. The SAC model not only increases the efficiency of estimation, but
also corrects the problem of bias in the OLS estimate. (The OLS estimate is biased if spatial
term dependence is encountered.) In addition, the SAC model also estimates the effects of the
neighborhood on a household. The significant positive coefficients of spatial lag term and
spatial error term suggest a strong positive correlation among neighbors. The estimated
coefficients for spatial lag and error terms differ slightly. The GMM estimates are

ρ = 0.201735 and λ = 0.230879 . The positive spatial lag dependence thus can be expressed
as when the neighborhood’s Engel coefficients increase 1% on average, this increase will be
followed by a 0.20% increase in the Engel coefficients for households. The positive spatial
error dependence reflects the high correlated unspecified factors of neighbors. It may be
caused by geographic backgrounds.
Spatial lag dependence can lead us to a very interesting deduction: A household will have
a higher (or lower) food share as a proportion to total household expenditure if it is located in
a poor (or rich) neighborhood. Stated another way, a poor (or rich) household located in a
rich (or poor) neighborhood will consume less (or more) food compared to their counterparts
in the poor (or rich) neighborhood. It’s interesting to see that the interaction is through food
share (or expenditure) but not through the amount of food consumed.34.

34

If interaction were through the amount of consumption, then on the effect on Engel’s coefficient is the
opposite: A household will consume more (or less) food and have a higher (or lower) food share if it is in a rich
(or poor) neighborhood with higher (or lower) food consumption amount.
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Summary
We have examined the effect of household factors and social factors on Engel’s

coefficient (or food share). Joint consideration of household factors and social factors not
only improves our estimation, but also shows us that household food consumption is both a
household behavior and a social behavior. In summary, we find that:
(1) Household income has a significant negative effect, which enlarges as the income
deciles in the society increase;
(2) The gender and the union status of the head of household have no significant effects.
The head of household’s marital status has a significant effect in the sense that heads of
household who report “never married” tend to have a higher Engel’s coefficient than others.
This may be a topic for further research.
(3) Household size has significant effects. The increase in household size will lead to
increase in total food consumption; however, marginal food consumption decreases, and so
the food share decreases, too. It might reflect the economy of household food consumption.
The presence of male members (adults and children) has a significant effect not found with
female adults or children in a household This might reflect discrimination against females in
household food consumption.
(4) The income deciles have significant effects. These deciles increase Engel’s coefficient
on one hand, and enlarge the negative effect of log income on Engel’s coefficient on the other.
(5) Neighborhood effects are significantly positive. An increase in a neighborhood’s
average Engel’s coefficient will lead to an increase in its household members’ Engel’s
coefficient. The unknown variables of neighbors that affect Engel’s coefficient are positively
correlated with each other.
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Application to Poverty Problem
Poverty Line

Ravallion and Bidani (1994) proposed the use of household level data to estimate an
Engel’s curve for food consumption and then used the estimated curve to calculate the
poverty line. Suppose that we estimate an Engel’s curve as Engel = f(Income | X) , where
income is the total household income (or expenditure) and X represents the conditional
variables, such as the previously discussed household factors and social factors. If we think
the household food poverty line is F, then we can find the household income poverty line I by
solving Engel = F / Income = f(Income | X) ; or if we think household poverty is measured
by a certain Engel coefficient E, we can find household income poverty line I by solving
E = f(Income | X) . The reason to determine a poverty line measured by household income is
that such a line is easy to define by comparing a household’s Engel’s coefficient and
household food consumption.
The poverty incidence in Jamaica was 16.9% in 2004. The poverty line in Jamaica is
defined as the minimum food basket divided by the average food share for the lowest income
quintile. The minimum food basket is based on the nutritional requirements established by the
World Health Organization, Pan American Health Organization, and the Jamaica Ministry of
Health. The poverty line is computed for a reference family of five, which includes one adult
male, one adult female, an infant, a teenager and a pre-teen child. The poverty line was
J$221,130.78 for a “Reference Family of 5” in 2004 (or J$167,083.1 in 2001). The poverty
line for individuals was J$58,508.5 in 2004 (or J$44,208.2 in 2001).35
The average food share for the lowest income quintile might be inappropriate for all
households and might cause a biased estimate. The Engel’s curve estimated in this paper
35

From Jamaica National Poverty Eradication Programme: www.npep.org.jm .
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should be able to be used to set up a household income poverty line for different prespecified
groups of households (grouped by the independent variables in our model, such as household
size, household structure, neighborhood, etc.).
An Estimation of Income Elasticity of Food Consumption

As mentioned before, Engel’s curve by itself is a demand curve and useful for estimating
income elasticity, a determination that is not only important for assessing food consumption
by poor people but also serves to estimate food demand in a society. From the estimated
curve, we are able to estimate the income elasticity of food consumption in Jamaica. It can be
described as: 36

τ = 1 − 1.01 ⋅

0.10208 + 0.008709 * popdec
Engel

For example, for three households with (popdec=2, Engel=.7), (popdec=5, Engel=.5) and
(popdec=9, Engel=.4), respectively, we can calculate their income elasticity as 0.827581,
0.705838, and 0.544336. We can easily find there is a negative relationship between income
elasticity and income, and there is also a negative relation between it and income deciles, i.e.
the income elasticity is not only less than 1, but also decreases as income increases. Equation
(6.1) should be useful when policy makers want to measure the effect on poor people of
subsidies such as food stamps.
Neighborhood Matters

From the previous section, we know that when the neighborhood’s Engel’s coefficients
increase 1% on average, this increase will cause a 0.20% increase in Engel’s coefficient for
households. The effect is significant. We know the household’s Engel’s coefficient varies
from 3% to 98%. If there are two identical households and they live in different
neighborhoods with an average Engel’s coefficient, respectively, equal to 40% (a rich
36

A change in one household’s Engel’s coefficient has a very small effect on the neighborhood, and the
feedback effect is minimal. Thus we can ignore the neighborhood effect here.
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neighborhood) and 70% (a poor neighborhood), then the first household will have a 6% lower
Engel’s coefficient compared with the second one. This might cause distortion in the
household’s expenditure. The unknown factors that cause neighbors to “copy” each other’s
expenditure structure have important implications for the issue of poverty. Will the
neighborhood improve or worsen the poverty problem? And will it cause the migration of
people? With a poverty policy that helps poor people through subsidies, the first problem can
be solved by establishing appropriate income poverty lines in different neighborhoods as
described in 6.1. The second question raises an issue for further research on the relationship
between migration and preference interdependence among neighborhoods.
The positive correlation in the error term can be caused by correlated factors not captured
in our model, such as geographic factors, the local economic environment, common risks, or
common expectations. This correlation may also suggest that poverty policy, which now
mostly targets households, should be able to target the common background of
neighborhoods.
Possible Discrimination against Females

Our estimation shows that male members of a household have a significant positive effect.
The increase in Engel’s coefficient caused by an additional male adult (or child) is 0.015093
(or 0.006413), more than that caused by an additional female member (either adult or child).
We can see that even male children could affect food consumption more than female adults
do. It’s very possible that in Jamaica, as in many other developing countries, discrimination
exists against females in food consumption.
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Essay 3: A Survival Analysis of Education Duration in Jamaica
Jamaica is a small island country with a population of 2.7 million and a GDP per capita in
2005 of 4,482 US dollars (PPP). In spite of its low rank in GDP per capita (111th among
world countries in 2005), Jamaica stands out in the developing world as a country with a
strong commitment to education: Public spending on education grew to 7.6% of GDP in
1997-1998. This was complemented by an estimated household spending of about 6% of
GDP. With significant public and private investment in education as well as successful
governmental education policies, the country has made impressive progress in providing
primary and secondary education.
In the 1990s, the Jamaica Ministry of Education and Culture (MOE&E) embarked on a
15-year “Reform of Secondary Education Program” (ROSE). The first phase focusing on
lower secondary schools has been completed. The second phase focuses on improving upper
secondary schools and on improving education quality at all levels.37 Although the education
system in Jamaica is complex and includes different types of schools that are constantly
evolving38, the system can be summarized and described as follows: Primary education is
from Grade 1 to Grade 6, lower secondary education is from Grade 7 to 9, and upper
secondary education is from Grade 10 to 11 (or 1339). In 1997-1998, the gross enrollment
rates were more than 100 percent in primary education, 97 percent in lower secondary
education, and 66 percent in upper secondary education. The net enrollment rates were 93

37

Sources: Jamaica Secondary Education, Volume I, World Bank Report No 19069-JM, 1999.
Note: “Time” is one of the most important key words in our study. However, in our paper “time” in different
contexts represents different things: It represents grade when we are talking about a time period in the survival
analysis, such as in the “discrete time survival analysis.”; It represents real time, such as year or age when we
are talking about the time/age effect on the dropout risks of students. Readers should be aware and refer to the
right meaning based on context.
39
Grades 12-13 are not required for attending tertiary education institutions in Jamaica.
38
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percent in primary education, 82 percent in lower secondary education, and 49 percent in
upper secondary education.40
According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2005), in 2002-03 the
gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary education in Jamaica were 101% and 84%,
respectively, and the net enrollment rates were 95% and 75%. In comparison, the gross
enrollment rates in 2002-03 for primary and secondary education in middle income countries
averaged 112% and 74%, respectively. The gross enrollment rate in secondary education in
Jamaica in 2002-03 was 10% higher than the average for middle income countries.
Although these are significant and impressive achievements, we also find that the net
enrollment rates decreased more than 10% from primary education to lower secondary
education, and furthermore, decreased more than 30% from lower secondary education to
upper secondary education. We might be eager to know “Where, What and How”: Where (or
in which grade) the students tend to drop out of school, what factors affect dropout behavior,
and how to increase education duration in Jamaica. We believe that research on these
questions will be informative and helpful to continued improvement of education in Jamaica.
In this paper, we will apply discrete time survival analysis to analyze education duration in
Jamaica: First we will analyze the data from JSLC 2002, investigate the pattern of
educational attainment in Jamaica, and summarize some related variables; then the discrete
time Cox model and the Logit model will be applied to estimate the effects of the related
covariates; in the end, we want to discuss the policy implications of our research to the
continued improvement of education in Jamaica.
The paper is structured as follows: In the first section, we will briefly review the literature
for education studies and the application of survival analysis. In the second section, we will
introduce the data and the survival techniques (the discrete time Cox model and the discrete
40

Sources: MOE&C Statistics; PIOJ, 1999, p. 37-45.
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time Logit model). In the third section, we will apply these survival techniques to exploration
of education duration in Jamaica. In fourth section, we will discuss the policy implications of
our findings. And in the last section, we will discuss the conclusions drawn from our research
and its limitations.

Literature Review
Education Literature
Since 1940s, the concept of “dropout” has been used to represent a category of people

who do not complete secondary education. For more than 50 years, this subject has attracted
enormous interest from economists, and substantial research has been done on the
determinants of dropping out. The dropout problem attracts much attention from economists
for various reasons. These reasons fall into three categories that can be summarized as
follows: (1) Dropping out undermines the individual’s future welfare: Dropouts tend to have
lower income and higher unemployment; Dropouts are also more likely to have health
problems, and as an economy upgrades, dropouts will have an even harder time surviving
economically. (2) Dropouts generate large social costs. They tend to receive more public
assistance and also tend to engage in criminal activities (Catterall, 1987; Rumberger, 1987
and 2001; Murnane & Levy, 1996). (3) Dropouts decrease human capital accumulation in a
country and thus in the long run damage the country’s economic growth. For developing
countries, education is the principal way to escape poverty and ignite sustainable economic
growth.41 However, dropouts may lead to a vicious cycle in developing countries: poor
education>poverty>poor education. The dropout rate is used to measure the probability of

41 Fulci (1999) said, ‘Education is the key to development. Quality basic education, as well as secondary and higher
education, vocational training, and skill acquisition throughout life are indispensable tools to eradicate poverty.’ (Reported
by Singh, 1999)
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dropping out of school. Reducing the dropout rate can break the cycle of poverty and is a
crucial part of poverty reduction in developing countries. For all of these reasons and more,
this issue has drawn the attention of economists and spurred their research into why students
drop out and how they can be retained in school. The importance of this issue has attracted
much attention from economists who have explored the reasons for dropping out and the
ways to deal with this problem.
One of the most popular economic theories for education/dropout issues is the theory of
human capital (Becker, 1967, 1981; Becker & Tomes, 1979, 1986). In this framework,
children’s human capital derives from two sources: First, the inheritance of genetic and
cultural endowments from parents, and second, the investments in children by parents.
Inheritance depends on the parents’ abilities, education, and cultural background. The
investments by the parents depend on parental preferences, income, and other factors. The
human capital theory emphasizes the effect of family factors on children’s educational
attainment. Other social disciplines such as sociology and psychology contribute many other
theories to the literature. These theories include peer/role models, a life span development
approach, a stress theory, the “working mother perspective,” and the “economic deprivation
perspective,” (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995).
Drawing on these various theories, Rumberger (2001) presents two conceptual
frameworks: One is from an individual perspective, and the other one is from an institutional
perspective. The individual framework focuses on the attributes of students, such as their
values, attitudes, and behaviors, and how these attributes contribute to their decisions about
their education. The institutional framework focuses on the settings and environment in
which children live, such as families, schools, and communities.
Haveman and Wolfe (1995) summarized three primary categories that will affect the
educational attainment of children: the choices made by the society/government that
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determine the opportunities available to both children and their parents (i.e. the social
investment in children); the choices made by parents regarding the quantity and quality of
family resources devoted to children (the parental investment in children); and the choices
that children make given the investments in and opportunities available to them. The
children’s educational attainment is the outcome of these choices. These three categories are
consistent with Remberger’s two frameworks. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) also provided a
useful review of the literature on dropout research, and we will summarize their main finding
as follows.
In one of earliest studies, Blau and Duncan (1967) used a system of recursive regression
equations to estimate the relationships among time-ordered, life cycle family background
characteristics and children’s educational attainment. In 1970s, the researchers of the
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study estimated the determinants of educational attainment based on
a life cycle framework that included the number of family members, school, and aspiration
variables. (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995)
The factors affecting children’s educational attainment in recent research can be
summarized as including social, family, choice, and background characteristics. Social
factors include background and quality of students in the school, race structure in the school,
school location (such as urban/rural and South/North), neighborhood, state and local
education expenditures, unemployment rates, etc. Family factors include characteristics of the
head of family (sex, education, and so on), family structure (parents, siblings, and so on),
parents’ occupation, family income, family birth plan, distance to schools, etc. Factors related
to students’ own choices include scores at school, expectations/self-esteem, pregnancy,
religious activities, etc. The background characteristics include race, gender, time, age,
opportunity wages, etc. The measurements of children’s educational attainment include a
high school graduation dummy variable, years of schooling, dropout risk, etc. Although
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Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Logit/Probit models are widely used, survival analysis
techniques have become more and more popular in the most recent literature (Haveman &
Wolfe, 1995).
Survival Analysis
(1) Survival Analysis and Its Application to Education

Survival analysis is a statistical technique for studying the occurrence and timing of
events. It is also known as event history analysis, reliability analysis, failure time analysis,
duration analysis, and transition analysis (Allison, 1995). Willet and Singer (1991, 1995) and
Singer and Willet (1992, 1993) introduced survival analysis (especially discrete time survival
analysis) to education issues (such as students’ education paths and teachers’ career paths).
Since then, it has become more and more popular in the analysis of education issues.
Some of the key concepts of survival analysis include time, event, survival function,
hazard, and the hazard function. Time is recorded when an event happens and can be
continuous or discrete. An event can be death, dropping out of school/some programs, or any
event that is of research interest. Survival and the hazard function will be introduced in detail
later.
(2) Advantages of Survival Analysis Compared with Traditional Methods
Enrollment rates are widely used to measure education status in a country. Enrollment
rates are typically available for primary, secondary, and college levels. Gross enrollment rates
are calculated as the number of enrolled students divided by the total population within the
specific age range eligible for enrollment in school. Net enrollment rates adjust the gross
enrollment numerator for students within the designated age range.42 We can see the

42
Here is an example of the calculation of an enrollment rate: n1 is the number of students in the primary
schools (Grades 1-6); n2 is the number of people within a certain age range who are eligible for enrollment in
the primary schools; n3 is the number of students in the primary schools who are also within a certain age range
who are eligible for enrollment in the primary schools. We have n3<=n1. The gross enrollment rate will equal
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limitations of enrollment rates: (1) it makes little sense to calculate an enrollment rate for
each grade, because students of the same age are not necessary to enroll in the same grade.
Enrollment rates by school level cannot accurately reflect education in each grade; (2)
enrollment rates are inappropriate as a reflection of the educational attainment of people
beyond the age for school; (3) it is difficult to measure the enrollment rates at different school
levels for the same cohort of people; thus, we do not have a way to “follow” a group of
people and see when they drop out of school; (4) and enrollment rates can be manipulated
easily. Researchers can get a higher or lower enrollment rate simply by changing the research
group. For example, including (excluding) a group of students (mostly in the lower grades)
with higher enrollment will increase (decrease) the enrollment rates.
Some empirical studies have applied Logit models to estimate graduation rates in primary
schools, secondary schools and colleges. In this line of research, the authors usually ask if a
student has graduated from school. These studies are helpful as a way to explore if the
students have made it through school. Their two limitations are that (1) they cannot handle
those students who are still in schools, and (2) they have little information on when (in which
grade) students tend to drop out. (Willett & Singer, 1991)
Some other studies have applied OLS model to estimate the duration of education and to
determine at what point students tend to dropout. (Duration at school is most often the
dependent variable.) However, OLS model still cannot overcome these problems: (1) Some
students are out of school because they are transferring to other schools or because of illness,
death, etc., but they are not dropouts and cannot be counted as such; consequently their
observed duration at school will be shorter than the actual duration; (2) for those students still
in school, the observed duration of education will be also shorter than the actual duration; (3)

n1/n2 and the net enrollment rate will equal to n3/n2. We can see that the gross enrollment rate is not less than
the net one, and it can be more than 100%.

77
and the estimation duration from OLS could be longer than the possibly longest duration.
Because of these limitations, the OLS estimate will tend to be biased.
Survival analysis can overcome all of these shortcomings. By estimating the dropout risk
for each grade, it provides detailed information on the dropout risks for students in each grade.
On the other hand, by treating as “censored observations” those students who do not drop out
during the period of research, it can account for those students who are still in school but
have transferred to other schools, or temporarily left school because of illness or other
reasons but are not dropouts. Moreover, survival analysis has one more advantage: the ability
to incorporate time varying data. While it is difficult for traditional models like OLS and
Logit models to incorporate time varying data, some survival models can do so easily and
naturally.
Because of the above advantages (ability to identify the timing of the problem, ability to
handle censored data, and ability to incorporate time varying variables) compared with
traditional methods, survival analysis has become more and more popular in social science
and natural science. The development of survival statistical techniques, its availability in
standard statistical software (such as SAS and STATA) and the improvement in data quality
has enabled researchers to apply survival analysis to education duration research.

Data and Empirical Methods
Data: Introduction and Summary
The data is from the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2002, which was undertaken to

establish baseline measurements of household welfare and subsequently to monitor the
impact of Jamaica’s Human Resources Development Program on health, education and
nutrition (The World Bank, 2002). The survey covers 6,976 households randomly selected
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from the Survey of Labor Force43. All household members older than 3 in 2002 were
included in the survey. After matching education data, household consumption data, and
household demographic data, etc., we were able to develop a data set that includes the
variables that might affect individual educational attainment. Understanding education and
related demographic variables can provide basic information for our survival modeling; thus
we summarize these variables as follows.
(1) School Enrollment
Table 1 shows Jamaican school enrollment in 2002, when 65.03% of the population was
not enrolled in any type of school (including institutes, colleges and universities). However,
7.11% of the people were enrolled in the Basic/Infant/Nursery/Kindergarten schools, and
15.79% of the people were enrolled in Grades1-6, which included primary schools, all-age
schools, and primary/junior high schools. The primary schools have better reputation than the
all-age and primary/junior high schools.)
About 10.69% of people were enrolled in the secondary schools of all types. About
8.67% were in secondary high schools (7.61%), technical schools (0.76%), and
vocational/agricultural schools (0.30%) (Grades 7-11 or 13); 2.02% were in all-age schools,
primary/junior high schools, and junior high schools (Grades 7-9), which have inferior
educational quality.
Universities or other tertiary schools accounted for 0.93% of the population, and 0.3% of
the people were enrolled in adult and special schools.
Table 1 also shows the difference in school enrollment between males and females.
Females were a relatively larger proportion of the enrollment in secondary high schools,
technical schools, vocational/agricultural schools, universities/post-secondary schools, and
43

LFS used a two-stage stratified sampling strategy, and the sample is self-weighted. That is, each household in
Jamaica is equally likely to be included in the survey sample. For details, please see Jamaica Survey of Living
Conditions 1988-2000: Basic Information, the World Bank (2002).
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adult education/night schools. The gap between female-male enrollments in favor of females
grew larger in upper level education.

80
12 (Essay 3) Table 1 Enrollment in Jamaica 2002 (by school type)
School Type
BASIC/INFANT/NURSERY
/KINDERGARTEN
Primary
ALL AGE (GRADES 1-6)
ALL AGE (GRADES 7-9)
Primary/JUNIOR HIGH
(GRADES 1-6)
Primary/JUNIOR HIGH
(GRADES 7-9)
JUNIOR HIGH
(GRADES 7-9)
SECONDARY HIGH
TECHNICAL
VOCAT/AGRIC
UNIVERSITY
OTHER TERTIARY
(PUBLIC)
OTHER TERTIARY
(PRIVATE)
ADULT LITERACY
CLASSES
ADULT
EDUCATION/NIGHT
SPECIAL SCHOOL
NONE
TOTAL

MALE
838

FEMALE
792

Grand Total
1,630

Percentage
7.11%

1,080
579
138
206

1,037
515
105
203

2,118
1,094
243
409

9.24%
4.77%
1.06%
1.78%

91

60

151

0.66%

36

33

69

0.30%

812
77
27
29
28

932
97
41
44
63

1,744
174
68
73
91

7.61%
0.76%
0.30%
0.32%
0.40%

16

32

48

0.21%

4

3

7

0.03%

14

32

46

0.20%

10
7,313
11,315

7
7,591
11,603

17
14,904
22,920

0.07%
65.03%
100.00%

(2) Educational Attainment
The JSLC 2002 also provided information on the educational attainment of people not in
schools in 2002. Table 2 resembles Table 1, but the two tables have totally different
meanings: Table 1 reflects the current education enrollment in schools in 2002, and Table 2
reflects the educational attainment by school type for persons not in school in 2002. Thus, the
two tables have very different distributions.
Table 2 shows that 19.98% of the people not enrolled in school in 2002 had a primary
school education (including primary, all-age, and primary/junior high schools). 71.52% had a
secondary school education. 27.58% of these people had been in all-age schools (Grades 7-9).
42.72% had been in new secondary (12.83%), comprehensive (5.27%), secondary high
(20.04%), technical (2.63%), and vocational/agricultural schools (1.95%).
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Here again we also see a gender difference in educational attainment. After secondary
school, more females than males are present at each level, and this gender gap grows larger as
the level of education increases. For secondary schools, males had a relatively larger
presence in the lower and lesser quality secondary schools, and females had a relatively
larger proportion of enrollment in the upper and better quality secondary schools. (Note: The
percentages of males and females not in schools in 2002 were 49% and 51%, respectively.
The numbers are shown in the last row in Table 2.)
13 (Essay 3) Table 2 Educational Attainment in Jamaica 2002 (by school type)
School Type
MALE
FEMALE
Grand Total
Percentage
32
41
73
0.50%
BASIC/INFANT/NURSERY
/KINDERGARTEN
1,025
1,066
2,091
14.36%
Primary
390
389
779
5.35%
ALL AGE (GRADES 1-6)
2,176
1,841
4,017
27.58%
ALL AGE (GRADES 7-9)
18
21
39
0.27%
Primary/JUNIOR HIGH
(GRADES 1-6)
50
37
87
0.60%
Primary/JUNIOR HIGH
(GRADES 7-9)
58
33
91
0.62%
JUNIOR HIGH
(GRADES 7-9)
920
949
1,869
12.83%
NEW SECONDARY1
362
406
768
5.27%
COMPREHENSIVE2
1,353
1,565
2,918
20.04%
SECONDARY HIGH
199
184
383
2.63%
TECHNICAL
91
193
284
1.95%
VOCAT/AGRIC
117
133
250
1.72%
UNIVERSITY
148
290
438
3.01%
OTHER TERTIARY
(PUBLIC)
60
112
172
1.18%
OTHER TERTIARY
(PRIVATE)
10
15
25
0.17%
ADULT LITERACY
CLASSES
14
43
57
0.39%
ADULT
EDUCATION/NIGHT
33
25
58
0.40%
SPECIAL SCHOOL
88
76
164
1.13%
NONE
7,144
7,419
14,563
100.00%
TOTAL
Note: 1. New secondary schools converted to comprehensive high in the 1998/1999
academic year.
2. Comprehensive high schools converted to secondary high in 2000/2001 academic y
ear.
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(3) Household Demographics
The JSLC 2002 recorded every household member’s relation to the head of household,
which provides useful information on household demographics. Table 3 shows the survey
comprised 6,795 households. However, only 2,911 heads of household had spouses or
partners. Furthermore, only 121 of 8,154 children of the heads had spouses. However, there
were 2,616 grandchildren of the heads in the households.) The exploration of household
demographic structure will help our modeling because family characteristics are expected to
greatly affect educational attainment.
14 (Essay 3) Table 3 Household Demographic Constituents in Jamaica 2002
Relation to head of household

Number

Percentage

Head

6,975

30.43%

Spouse/Partner

2,911

12.70%

Child of Head/Spouse

8,154

35.58%

121

0.53%

2,616

11.41%

237

1.03%

1,537

6.71%

31

0.14%

Spouse of Child
Grandchild
Parent of Head/Spouse
Other Relative
Helper/Domestic

335

1.46%

22,917

1.00%

Other Not Relative
Total

(4) Student Distribution by Grade
In Table 1, we saw the school enrollment of Jamaica in 2002. Now we will continue to
explore student distribution by grade. Table 4 lists the number of students and percentages for
Grades 1-13 in 2002. The progression in grade levels is marked by a visible trend of
diminishing enrollment. This enrollment decline accelerates after Grade 9: from Grade 9 to
Grade 10, the decrease is about 1.82%; from Grade 10 to 11, the decrease is about 1.99%;
and from Grade 11 to 12, the decrease jumps to about 4.75%. The table shows that after
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lower secondary school, the number of students declined sharply. The huge decrease from
Grade 11 to Grade 12 is not especially surprising because only a few upper secondary schools
have Grades 12 and 13.
15 (Essay 3) Table 4 Student Distribution in Jamaica 2002 (Grades 1-13)
Grade
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Number
661
623
621
589
568
559
532

Percentage
11.09%
10.45%
10.42%
9.88%
9.53%
9.38%
8.93%

Grade
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total

Number
515
532
424
305
22
9
5,960

Percentage
8.64%
8.93%
7.11%
5.12%
0.37%
0.15%
100.00%

18 (Essay 3) Figure 1 Student Distribution in Jamaica 2002 (Grade 1-13)
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(5) Educational Attainment-by Grade Reported
Now we turn to analyzing the educational attainment (by grade and age group) of those
people not currently in school in 2002. Table 5 and Figure 2 show that the younger
generations generally have higher educational attainment than their elders. For people older
than 60, the educational peaks are at Grade 6 (around 45%) and Grade 9 (around 25%); for
people between ages 41 and 60, the peaks are at Grade 6 (around 21%), Grade 9 (around
40%), and Grade 11 (around 18%); for people between 21 and 40, the peaks are at Grade 9
(28%) and Grade 11 (53%); and for people between 3 and 20, the peaks are at Grade 9 (22%)
and Grade 11 (58%)44. The increase in educational attainment over time is obvious.

44

A large proportion of people between ages 3 and 20 are still in school, which will be treated as censored
observations in the following survival analysis.
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16 (Essay 3) Table 5 Educational Attainment in Jamaica 2002: Grade Reported (by age
group)
Grade
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Total

Age 3-20
6
6
11
13
39
34
28
47
308
92
813
5
1,402

Age 21-40
13
20
55
46
155
147
90
166
1,627
374
3,018
11
5,722

Age 41-60
18
32
68
86
137
741
82
134
1,335
72
607
7
3,319

Age> 60
20
60
115
168
133
1,149
65
101
602
7
39
1
2,460

Total
57
118
249
313
464
2,072
265
448
3,872
545
4,477
24
12,904

Percentage
0.44%
0.91%
1.93%
2.43%
3.60%
16.06%
2.05%
3.47%
30.01%
4.22%
34.69%
0.19%
100.00%

19 (Essay 3) Figure 2 Educational attainment in Jamaica 2002 (by age group)
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(6) Other Demographics
The marital and union statuses were also reported in the survey. They are summarized in
Table 6-1 and 6-2.
17 (Essay 3) Table 6-1 Marital Status Reported (age >=15)
Marital Status

Number

Percentage

MARRIED

4,046

24.96%

NEVER MARRIED

10,795

66.60%

DIVORCED

123

0.76%

SEPARATED

185

1.14%

WIDOWED

905

5.58%

UNKNOWN

154

0.95%

18 (Essay 3) Table 6-2 Union Status Reported (age >=15)
Union Status

Number

Percentage

MARRIED

3,903

24.09%

COMMON LAW

2,606

16.08%

VISITING

2,028

12.52%

SINGLE

5,633

34.77%

NONE

1,754

10.83%

(7) Summary
In this section, we have briefly described the educational attainment and demographic
variables in Jamaica. We also have explored the basics of gender and time/age effects on
educational attainment. From the tables, especially Tables 4 and 5, we can get useful
information on educational attainment in 2002 by grade for both students and nonstudents. As
we discussed in the previous section, integration of the information in these two tables is
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difficult with traditional methods. However, survival analysis easily handles this integration
issue through its “censored data” analytical strategy.
As already observed, survival analysis has other superior attributes for this type of
analysis. The next section will introduce the survival techniques used in this paper and then
apply them to explore dropout risk by grade and estimate the effects of covariates such as
household income (household total expenditure), gender, head of household, household
demographic variables, time, and government policy, etc.
Empirical Methods: Introduction to Survival Analysis
(1) Basic Concepts
Survival Function

Survival function (or survivor function, survivorship function) gives the probability of
surviving after a specific time. In survival analysis, surviving not only refers to the status of
being alive but also to a status of not having experienced or engaged in or performed a
specific event or action, such as divorce or dropping out of a program or, to use a business
example, a company’s bankruptcy, and so on. In this paper, surviving refers to the specific
status of not having dropped out of school. The survival function can be written as

=

Pr(T>t), where t is time, and T is the time of the occurrence of an event.
Hazard Function

The hazard function is crucial in survival analysis. The hazard at a specific time
corresponds directly to the risk of the occurrence of an event. In this paper, hazard is the
dropout risk/rate of students. The hazard function can be defined as:

where dt is a time period,

is the density distribution function of an event occurrence.
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The relationship between the survival function and the hazard function can be written as

For discrete time, the hazard is defined as the conditional probability of the occurrence of
an event, given that no previous event has occurred (Singer and Willet, 1993). It can be
referred to as discrete time hazard function:

where T is the time of event occurrence.
The relationship between the discrete time hazard function and the survival function can
be written as:

In this paper, school grade level is used as the measurement of educational attainment,
and the discrete time survival analysis is applied.
(2) Semi-parametric Analysis: Cox Regression
Cox (1972) proposes a semi-parametric regression, which has become one of the most
popular methods in survival analysis. Compared with other regression methods, Cox
regression does not need to choose some particular probability distribution to represent
survival times. Such probability distributions, when they have been used, have been typically
arbitrary assumptions. Without them, the results of Cox regression will be more robust. The
Cox method can handle continuous and discrete data. However, we will only introduce the
discrete time method, which is the method applied in our paper.
The basic idea of the Cox regression for discrete time data is to estimate a binary model
to predict whether an event does or does not occur in each time period. Cox regression then
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relates the conditional probability of event occurrence (

)45 to the covariates by a Logit

equation:

In the equation,

is a set of constants for each time period and controls the time

variance of the regression model.

is the covariate array that can include time unvarying

variables as well as time varying variables. In this model, the odds ratio between any two
individuals does not depend on time, thus the model can be described as a proportional odds
model. The semi-parametric method will make use of this characteristic and will not estimate
.46 That is to say, the estimation ignores the baseline hazard function and focuses only
on the estimation of the effects of the covariates. However, after estimating the coefficients of
the covariates, the nonparametric maximum likelihood method can still be used to estimate
the survival function,

.

(3) Parametric Analysis: Logit Model
In the Cox regression, the semi-parametric estimation discards the information of

.

However, the traditional Logit model can be used to estimate the model. With the Logit
model, we can directly estimate the effect of time,

. Meanwhile, the maximum likelihood

method to estimate the Logit model is more computationally efficient than the semiparametric method used in the Cox regression.
Allison (1995) argues that uncontrolled heterogeneity confounds the hazard function and,
thus research on the shape of the hazard function might yield incorrect information. He
suggests that researchers should be cautious when using alternatives to the Cox regression to
study the time dependence of the hazard function.

45

The conditional probability of event occurrence is also known as a discrete time hazard in the Cox regression,
which is the same as in Singer and Willet (1993).
46
For details of the estimation algorithm, please see Cox (1972).
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Empirical Analyses
In this section, survival analysis is applied as follows: First, we will apply semiparametric survival analysis using Cox regression’s discrete time survival model. Cox
regression makes no assumption of the baseline hazard function of time, and therefore the
estimation of covariates’ coefficients will be robust. Second, we will apply parametric
survival analysis, i.e., the Logit model for the survival analysis, to estimate the effects of
covariates as well as the baseline hazard function of time. The comparison of the estimation
result to the result obtained by the Cox regression could test the accuracy of the model.
However, the use of current variables to explain the occurrence of a past event is a
problem common to other studies and also occurs here. This problem is resolved by
narrowing the research field from the entire population to the youngest group, i.e., people
ages 3 to 20. The variables in the survey should be applicable for modeling of this group. For
example, Figure 3, shows that almost all people in this group (ages 3-20) are unmarried.
Because marriage is a crucial event that will affect household formation and thus variables at
the household level, this fact thus supports our assumption to some extent.
On the other hand, although information on older generations will be lost by narrowing
the research focus, we believe that such loss is justifiable because the refined study will
provide more up-to-date and useful information for policy makers. Thus, people aged 3-20
will be the focus of our survival modeling.
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20 (Essay 3) Figure 3 Number of People by Marriage and Age

Semi-parametric Survival Analysis: Cox Regression
(1) Covariates in the Survey

Based on previous analysis and on the literature, the model could include income, gender,
age, educational attainment, and gender of heads of households, number of siblings,
geography, and distance to schools, etc. We will expect the following effects on educational
attainment:
Income: A positive effect; educational attainment should increase when household
income increases. The survey does not report total household income, so household total
expenditure is used as a proxy for household income.
Gender: Females will have positive effect because females have better educational
attainment in general. In the model, females have a value of 1, and males have a value of
0.
Age (or Time): A negative effect; younger generations should have higher educational
attainment because of the improvement of education quality by government policy, etc.
Educational attainment of the head of household: A positive effect because a
household head with more education should lead to higher educational attainment of
children.
Gender of head of household: Some literature suggests that a female head of household
might have a negative effect. In the model, females have a value of 1, and males have a
value of 0.
Number of siblings: A negative effect; more siblings will lead to lower educational
attainment of children.
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Geographic area: Jamaica can be divided into three geographic areas: Kingston
Metropolitan Area (KMA), Other Towns, and Rural Areas. People living in KMA and
Other Towns areas should have higher educational attainment.
Distance to schools: A negative effect; the farther the distance to schools, the higher the
education cost will be, which will lead to lower educational attainment. Because not all
people report the distance to schools, we used the average distance (in miles) to schools
for people within the same district. Thus, we obtained the distance to the nearest primary
school and the distance to the nearest secondary school.
Meanwhile, we also suspect that the effect of age (time) may vary in primary, lower, and

upper secondary education. Consequently, we created interaction variables between age and
these school types. As a result of these considerations, we have individual variables (gender,
age), family variables (household income, gender, and education of heads of households,
number of siblings), and school variables (distance to schools). An age variable can also be
used to control the time effect.
(2) Estimation
After getting the variables available from JSLC 2002, we can estimate a discrete time
Cox model. The result is shown in Table 7. We can see that 6,982 individuals are included in
the model and 92.17% of them are censored. This should not be a surprise, because the
research subjects are ages 3-20 and most of them were at school at that time. As noted earlier,
the capability to handle censored data is one of the biggest advantages of survival analysis,
and that advantage is also one of the main reasons we chose to use survival analysis in the
study.
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The table shows that all three global null hypothesis tests (likelihood ratio test, score test
and Wald test) are significant (p<.0001). Household income, gender, age, grade level attained
by the head of household, number of siblings, and distance to the nearest secondary school
are all significant, but the gender of the head of household, distance to nearest primary school,
and the geographic dummy variables (KMA, Other Towns?, and Rural Areas) are not
statistically significant. The interaction between age and the dummy variable for primary
school is significant, but the interaction between age and the lower secondary school dummy
variable is not significant. The full expression of the model can be written as:47

47

Standard errors for the coefficients are reported inside the parenthesis below the coefficients. Please note that
in the model. 47
Cox regression doesn’t estimate time effect, i.e.
***:.0001 significant level; **: .001 significant level; *.01 significant level
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As noted earlier, we also can estimate a Logit model for the discrete time survival model
if we want to know the effects of time. For convenience, we will continue to estimate a Logit
model and then compare it with the result from this model. After that, we can discuss these
comparative findings.
19 (Essay 3) Table 7 Estimation of Discrete Time Cox Model
Total Obs
6,982
Covariates
Household Income (log form)
Gender
Age

Event

Censored

547

6,435

Censored
92.17%

Coefficient
-1.0213
-0.5001
0.1224

Chi-Square
170.2995
27.6982
11.693

Pr>ChiSq
<.0001
<.0001
0.0006

Age*Primary
Age*Lower Secondary
Grade of Head
Gender of Head
Sibling Number

0.1689
-0.0721
-0.1060
-0.0362
0.0763

7.8053
1.5199
27.2024
0.1504
18.0029

0.0052
0.2176
<.0001
0.6981
<.0001

Distance-Primary
Distance-Secondary
KMA Area
Other Towns

-0.0113
0.0698
0.0788
0.0519

0.2661
25.6078
0.2563
0.1444

0.6059
<.0001
0.6127
0.704

Chi-Square
396.5562
394.1473
370.7448

DF
12
12
12

Chi-Square
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Testing Global Null Hypothesis
Test
Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald

Parametric Survival Analysis: Logit Model
In this section we will apply a traditional Logit model to survival analysis and estimate

the time effect. The Logit model has become popular for discrete time survival analysis
because it is easier to understand and use. Before the Logit model can be used, however, the
cross-sectional data must be transformed into a new data set categorized by time and
individual. That is to say, each individual will have several observations that correspond to
his or her “current” grade level. Moreover, each observation must include new time/grade
dummy variables. Singer and Willett (1993) demonstrate in detail how to transform the
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relevant data. The estimation of the Logit model is shown in Table 8. In comparing Table 8 to
Table 7, the close similarity of the estimation of the coefficients of the covariates is obvious
because the Cox model applied a semi-parametric method to the estimation of a Logit model
that does not include the time effect. Table 8 also includes the time/grade effect. Because the
estimation results are very similar, we can focus on the estimation result from the Logit
model and discuss its findings.
(1) Income Effect
Household income has a positive and significant effect on educational attainment. The
coefficient of the log form of household total expenditure is -1.0222, and the odds ratio is
0.360. The result shows that the increase in household income will decrease the risk of
dropping out of school and thus increase individual educational attainment. An increase in
log income by 1 will reduce the odds ratio by 64%. This finding is consistent with the
previous study.
(2) Gender Effect
The gender effect is very significant. The coefficient is -0.5005, and the odds ratio 0.606.
The result reflects that females are at lower risk of dropping out and achieve higher
educational attainment. Females have an odds ratio that is 60.6% of males’.
(3) Time-Age Effect
We estimate age and its interaction variables with primary and lower secondary school
types. The upper secondary school dummy variable is left out of the model. The coefficient
of age variable, 0.1125, is significant. The coefficient of the interaction between age and the
primary school dummy variable is 0.169, which is also significant. However, the interaction
between age and the lower secondary school dummy variable is -0.0721 and not significant
with a 20% confidence level. The result shows that in general the dropout risk increases as
age increases, i.e., younger people are associated with lower dropout risks. This finding tells
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that educational attainment improves over time. The improvement is much greater for those
in primary school education than for those in secondary schools. Lower secondary school
education does not perform better than upper secondary school education. In fact, the
performance for lower secondary schools is slightly worse but not significant. Nevertheless,
this result for the lower secondary schools surprises us because our research subjects (aged 320) were in the secondary schools during the ROSE I project (implemented after 1994),
which tried to reform lower secondary school education.
If we look at the odds ratio, for every year that students age, the odds ratio will increase
by 13% in general and by 31.4% in primary school. In other words, the odds ratio decreases
by 13% annually in general and by 31.4% annually in primary school. This improvement can
be attributed to the Jamaican government’s educational policies and to the nation’s
determination and efforts to improve its education.
(4) Effects of Head of Household
The literature shows that head of household might have two effects on educational
attainment: The educational attainments of the household’s children might be positively
correlated to the attainments of the head of household or the gender of head of the household
might affect the educational attainments of the children48. Our estimation shows that the
educational attainment of the head of the household has a significant effect, -0.1061, and the
associated odds ratio is 0.964. That is to say that for every additional grade of educational
attainment by the head of a household, the odds ratio related to the risk of a child in the
household dropping out will be reduced by 3.6%. As for the impact of the gender of the head
of household, however, the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant.
(5) Effect of the Number of Siblings
48

For example, Buchmann and Hannum (2001) performed a review of the literature that shows that in some
African contexts female headship appears to be associated with greater educational opportunities for children in
South Africa (Fuller and Liang, 1999)? and in? sub-African countries (Lloyd and Blanc, 1996).
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The coefficient for the variable concerning the number of siblings is significant, 0.0764,
and the odds ratio is 1.079. In other words, for every additional sibling in a family, the odds
ratio for a child’s risk of dropping increases by 7.9%. This is also consistent with the
literature. More siblings mean fewer family resources to put into education for each child,
which might cause lower educational attainment. In explaining the effect of siblings,
Buchmann and Hannum (2001) emphasize the importance of understanding the social and
economic contexts in which families make educational decisions for their children.
(6) School Effect
The literature shows that the distance from home to school will affect educational
attainment. In our estimation, the distance to primary school has no significant effect.
However, the distance to secondary school has a significant effect, 0.0764, and the odds ratio
is 1.072. That is to say, an increase in distance by 1 mile will increase the odds ratio by 7.2%.
(7) Geographic Effect
Jamaica is divided into three geographic areas: KMA, Other Towns, and Rural Areas. The
literature highlights the difference in education quality between rural and urban areas.
However, after we control other variables, we cannot find a significant difference between
them. This suggests that geography does not directly influence educational attainment;
instead it is the characteristics of geographic areas that have direct effects.
(8) Time-Grade Effect
The Logit model includes an estimate of a time effect. In this study, our research time
span is from Grade 1 to 11: i.e., students who have completed Grade 11 are treated as
survivors. Each time/grade is associated with a baseline hazard, which is derived by assuming
that all other variables are 0.
Our estimation has 10 dummy variables, one each for Grades 1 to 10. These produce a
clear pattern of coefficients in which the coefficients increase as the grade levels increase and
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all of these coefficients are negative except for Grade 10. The coefficients for Grades 7-9 are
negative but not significant. These results tell us two things. First, in general the baseline
hazards increase as grade levels increase but Grade 10 is an exception and has a higher
baseline hazard than Grade 11. Second, the coefficients of Grades 7-9 are not significant,
which shows that grades in the secondary schools differ little in baseline hazard except for
Grade 10, which has a much higher baseline hazard. This result for Grade 10 might reflect a
space shortage in the upper secondary schools that prevents students from achieving higher
educational attainment.

99
20 (Essay 3) Table 8 Estimation of Discrete Time Survival Model-Logit Model
Covariates

Coefficient

Chi-Square

Pr>ChiSq

8.4172
-19.3456
-7.0268
-6.8301

51.3959
0.0085
36.915
35.5478

<.0001
0.9267
<.0001
<.0001

grade5
grade6
grade7
grade8

-6.4051
-6.179
-4.9914
-0.995
-0.9229

32.4019
30.4034
20.7265
0.9419
0.7838

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.3318
0.376

grade9
grade10
Household Income (log form)
Gender
Age

-0.3469
0.859
-1.0222
-0.5005
0.1225

0.1088
42.7507
170.3635
27.7172
11.701

0.7415
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0006

Age*Primary
Age*Lower Secondary
Grade of Head
Gender of Head
Sibling Number

0.169
-0.0721
-0.1061
-0.0362
0.0764

7.8084
1.5211
27.223
0.1507
18.0159

0.0052
0.2175
<.0001
0.6979
<.0001

Distance-Primary
Distance-Secondary
KMA Area
Other Towns

-0.0113
0.0699
0.079
0.0519

0.2662
25.6257
0.2571
0.1445

0.6059
<.0001
0.6121
0.7039

Chi-Square
2060.0773
4180.3474
1210.4211

DF
22
22
22

Chi-Square
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Intercept
grade1
grade2
grade3
grade4

Testing Global Null Hypothesis
Test
Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald
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(9) Summary
After getting the estimates, we can write the estimated Logit model as follows: 49

As a demonstration, we can use our estimation to draw hazard and survival curves for a
typical individual with median values of those variables as follows: household income is
J$283,32250; age is 18; the head of household has completed Grade 10; there are five siblings;
and the distance to a secondary school is 3.03 miles. We also will have hazard and survival
curves by gender as in Figure 4. As we can see, the hazards at Grade 10 are almost two times
as many as those at Grade 11. This is mostly caused by the shortage of space for students in
the upper level secondary schools.
To demonstrate the application of our estimation, we will use as an example our analysis
of the effect of the ROSE II project in its effort provide enough space in the upper secondary
schools. Based on our estimation and on an assumption that after completion of the ROSE II
49
50

***:.0001 significant level; **: .001 significant level
In 2002, 1 US dollar=48.416 JM dollars.
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project the peak at Grade 10 will decline to the same level as that at Grade 11, we can
estimate that the probability that these typical individuals will complete Grade 11 will
increase by about 5%, to 86% from 81%. 51
21 (Essay 3) Figure 4-1 Estimated Hazard Curves for Typical Individuals

22 (Essay 3) Figure 4-2 Estimated Survival Curves for Typical Individuals

51

Specifically, the increases are 4.7% (from 85% to 89.7%) for females and 6.7% (from 77% to 83.7%) for
males. The calculation process is omitted. Readers should be able to calculate the numbers based on Table 8.
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23 (Essay 3) Figure 5-1 Life Table Analysis-Survival Curve, by age group and gender

24 (Essay 3) Figure 5-2 Life Table Analysis-Dropout Hazard Curve, by age group and
gender
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Policy Implications
In the previous sections, we examined the JSLC data and applied survival analysis
techniques to explore education duration in Jamaica. To some extent, the findings should be
able to answer the questions of “Where, What and How”: where (or in which grade) the
students tend to drop out of school, what factors affect dropout behavior, and how to increase
education duration.
Where Is the Problem?
From Table 8, we can see the coefficients of the dummy variables of Grades 1-10. This

table tells us the distribution of dropout risk is as follows:
(1) Primary Schools
In general, dropout risks were quite low in primary schools. Nevertheless, there was a
trend of increasing risks from Grade 1 to Grade 6. Grade 6 especially had a huge increase in
dropout risk compared with Grade 5. In Table 8, the coefficient of Grade 6 is 1.1876 higher
than that of Grade 5, which means an odds ratio increase of about 2.28 times. Figure 4 shows
that the estimated hazard for typical individuals in Grade 6 is significantly higher than for
those in Grades 1-5, and Grade 6 has the same hazard level as in the lower secondary schools.
(It is even slightly higher than the estimated hazards in Grade 7 and Grade 8.) This finding is
very interesting and also confusing: Why did the dropout risk “suddenly” increase in the last
year of primary schools when students were so near a graduation certification? Another thing
worthy of note is that the curves for females and males diverge after Grade 6 as the effect of
gender becomes increasingly obvious with the increase in the risk of dropping out.
(2) Lower Secondary Schools
The dropout risks in lower secondary schools were similar in Grade 7 and in Grade 8.
However, Figure 4 shows that the dropout risk almost doubled in Grade 9. Table 8 shows that
the coefficient increased from -0.9229 in Grade 8 to -0.3469 in Grade 9, which means an
odds ratio increase of about 0.779 times. Again we are confronted by the same question of
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why the dropout risk “suddenly” increased in the last year of primary schools when a
graduation certification was within reach.
The second problem in the lower secondary schools is that the improvement over time is
slower than in primary schools (and even slower than in secondary schools, although not
significant.). The lag in improvement in the lower secondary schools deserves attention
because the ROSE I project that targeted lower secondary schools was completed in this
period.
(3) Upper Secondary Schools
The upper secondary schools carried the highest dropout risks. This is obvious in Figure 4.
Table 8 shows (1) that Grade 10 has a positive coefficient compared with Grade 11, and (2)
Grades 1-9 have negative coefficients compared with Grade 11. As discussed earlier, one of
main reasons for the high dropout risk in Grade 10 is because of space shortages in the upper
secondary schools. However, even after we eliminate this effect by assuming that Grade 10
has the same dropout risk as Grade 11, thus controlling for the effect of a space shortage, the
dropout risks in upper secondary high schools remain quite high. In Figure 4, the numbers are
6% and 4%, respectively, for males and females. Using the same assumption, we can estimate
that 8% and 5%, respectively, of males and females could not go to upper secondary schools
because of the space shortage. The unanswered question is why the dropout risks were so
high despite the students’ successfully entry into the upper secondary schools?
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What Factors Matter?
The analysis thus far has revealed the factors that could affect dropout risk. As a summary,

we know that (1) household income, age, and the grade level achievement of the head of
household have positive effects on educational attainment, and females typically surpass
males in educational attainment; (2) the number of siblings and the distance to secondary
schools have negative effects; and (3) the gender of the head of household head and the
geographic area have no effect.
How: Some Policy Suggestions
Based on the foregoing analysis, some policy suggestions for continued improvement of

education are:
(1) Target the Right Place
In general, secondary schools (especially upper secondary schools) have higher dropout
risks. While this generalization is noteworthy, the most effective way to lessen dropout risks
would be to focus on several “problematic” grades: Grade 6, Grade 9, and Grade 10. There is
a need especially to determine why dropout risks increased so dramatically in the last year of
primary school and lower secondary school. Were the students intimidated by the prospect of
a difficult last year? The high dropout risk observed in Grade 10 was caused by two factors:
admission limitation (a space shortage in upper secondary school) and voluntary dropouts. As
we have estimated, providing enough space in upper secondary school might increase the
percentage of graduation from secondary schools by 5%, to 86% from 81%.
(2) Gender Difference
In our estimation in Figure 4, we can see an 8% difference in survival rates between
females and males. This is a significant percentage. If survivorship for males could be raised
to the same level of females, it would mean about a 4% increase in the percentage of
graduation from secondary schools. However, we do not know the reasons for the gender gap
in education. Although much literature has been developed, little of it relates directly to
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Jamaica. (And in many developing countries, the gender gap favors males because females
receive less education because of social discrimination.) A study of this issue should be able
to provide useful policy guidance for solving the problem of inferior educational performance
by males in Jamaica.
(3) How to Break the Cycle of Poverty?
Our estimation shows that household income and educational achievement, as measured
by the grade level achievement of the head of household, had significant effects on
educational attainment. Household income directly affects the resources available for
children’s education. The effect of the grade level achievement of the head of household
might come from two sources: inheritance, and awareness of education’s importance. Human
capital theories show that higher educational attainment is associated with higher income.
And the absence of such attainment is associated with a cycle of poverty represented by:
poverty (Generation I)>low educational attainment (Generation II) > low income (Generation
II) + low educational attainment (Generation II) > low educational attainment (Generation
III)…
This depiction of the poverty cycle shows that it can be broken by any one of three ways:
(1) increased family income; (2) increased parental education; (3) increased educational
attainment of children. Several projects have been undertaken in Jamaica to help the poor,
such as the Jamaica National Poverty Eradication Programme, School Feeding Programme,
Rural Electrification Programme (REP), and so on. Such programs have increased family
income and thus have the potential to increase the educational attainment of poor people.
Increasing parental education is more difficult, although there are adult schools. The more
feasible way might be for the government to adopt a policy to increase the awareness among
parents of the importance of education. To increase the educational attainment of children,
we should focus on school quality and increased effort by students. Unfortunately, our
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research does not yield much information directly related to the quality of schools. The only
factor related to schools is the variable of distance to secondary schools, which had a
significant negative effect on educational attainment. Thus, we suggest that increased space
in the upper secondary schools should be achieved by building new schools instead of
enlarging the current ones. (If new schools can only be created by much higher expenditures,
this goal should still be pursued by emphasizing cost effective policies.) Another study
focusing on school quality and the effect on students should be able to provide useful policy
guidance.
(4) Uncontrollable Effects
The effects of age (time), gender of the head of household, number of siblings and
geographic factors are uncontrollable. As we have seen in Figure 5, education in Jamaica is
improving continuously and significantly over time. However, the time effect chronicled here
relates mainly to the past efforts in education of the Jamaican people and government and
may not have the same effect in the future. Gender of the head of household is uncontrollable,
and in any case, the effect was insignificant. The number of siblings had a negative effect on
educational attainment. It is common sense in terms of economics that more children mean
fewer resources for each child. However, as a social phenomenon, the number of children in a
family is hard to control by governmental policy. Geographic factors are also uncontrollable.
However, after controlling for other covariates in our model, geographic effects became
insignificant. A governmental policy that directly targets a geographic area might not be
necessary.
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Conclusions
In our study we have applied survival techniques to analyze education duration in
Jamaica based on JSLC 2002 data. Because of the limitation of the data, we do not have time
varying covariates. Thus we focused on the youngest cohort, who had an age range of 3-20,
and we assumed that the values of the covariates would change little for them. Although this
focus loses information on the older generations, such a study still could provide useful
information for policy makers who deal with current issues in education.
The estimation results of the Cox regression and the Logit model are very similar, and the
Logit model gives us an extra estimation of the time (grade) effect. The estimated model can
be used to estimate an individual’s hazard function as we have shown in Figure 4. The
analysis in this section provides information about where the problem was and what caused
the problem. The results could be used by policy makers to target the right persons and right
time to reduce dropout rates. They also could estimate the effects of education policies, their
economic background, and their demographic characteristics. In the previous section, we
provide some policy implications based on our research.
However, our study did have several obvious limitations. First, we did not have time
varying variables from the survey data, a lack that might cause inaccurate estimation of the
effects of the covariates. Longitudinal data based on several continuous surveys for the same
cohort would improve our estimation. Second, we did not have enough variables. The
Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2002 has a section on education, but the variables we
can use from it are very limited. Our covariates can be grouped into approximately four
categories: individual characteristics (gender, age), family characteristics (household income,
gender and educational attainment of the head of household, and number of siblings), school
characteristics (distances to primary and secondary schools), geographic characteristics
(KMA, Other Towns and Rural Areas), and a time/grade variable. The variables are very
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limited, and we cannot estimate the effects of many other important factors, such as school
quality, exam scores, etc. Third, we measured educational attainment based on education
duration of individuals (i.e. their grades completed or attending). However, education
duration does not distinguish the difference in quality between types of schools. For example,
a graduate from the all-age schools generally has lower educational attainment than a
graduate from the primary schools because all-age schools generally are inferior to the
primary schools. Further studies in these fields will allow better estimations.
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APPENDIX
Solutions for Equations from Totally Differentiating FOCs (1), (2) and (3)
After totally differentiating FOCs, we can solve the equations as followings:

The sign of the derivatives are undetermined. However, if we know that X and Y are
normal goods, we’ll have

and

Under some conditions, we can make

. i.e. Under these assumptions, we’ll have the conclusion that the club size will
increase as income increases. In our paper, we’ll base on this assumption which can simplify
our analysis and also not affect the analysis framework.
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